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Abstract
Block and stream ciphers are widely used to protect the privacy of digital informa-
tion. A variety of attacks against block and stream ciphers exist; the most recent
being the algebraic attacks. These attacks reduce the cipher to a simple algebraic
system which can be solved by known algebraic techniques. These attacks have
been very successful against a variety of stream ciphers and major efforts (for ex-
ample eSTREAM project) are underway to design and analyze new stream ciphers.
These attacks have also raised some concerns about the security of popular block
ciphers. In this thesis, apart from designing new stream ciphers, we focus on ana-
lyzing popular nonlinear transformations (Boolean functions and S-boxes) used in
block and stream ciphers for various cryptographic properties, in particular their
resistance against algebraic attacks. The main contribution of this work is the de-
sign of two new stream ciphers and a thorough analysis of the algebraic immunity
of Boolean functions and S-boxes based on power mappings.
First we present WG, a family of new stream ciphers designed to obtain a
keystream with guaranteed randomness properties. We show how to obtain a math-
ematical description of a WG stream cipher for the desired randomness properties
and security level, and then how to translate this description into a practical hard-
ware design. Next we describe the design of a new RC4-like stream cipher suitable
for high speed software applications. The design is compared with original RC4
stream cipher for both security and speed.
The second part of this thesis closely examines the algebraic immunity of Boolean
functions and S-boxes based on power mappings. We derive meaningful upper
bounds on the algebraic immunity of cryptographically significant Boolean power
functions and show that for large input sizes these functions have very low al-
gebraic immunity. To analyze the algebraic immunity of S-boxes based on power
mappings, we focus on calculating the bi-affine and quadratic equations they satisfy.
We present two very efficient algorithms for this purpose and give new S-box con-
structions that guarantee zero bi-affine and quadratic equations. We also examine
these S-boxes for their resistance against linear and differential attacks and provide
iii
a list of S-boxes based on power mappings that offer high resistance against linear,
differential, and algebraic attacks. Finally we investigate the algebraic structure of
S-boxes used in AES and DES by deriving their equivalent algebraic descriptions.
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Cryptography is the science of providing secure services. Until 1970s cryptography
was considered the domain of military and governments only. However the ubiq-
uitous use of computers and the advent of internet has made it an integral part
of our daily lives. Today cryptography is at the heart of many secure applications
such as online banking, online shopping, online government services such as filing
personal income taxes, cellular phones, and wireless LANS (Local Area Networks)
etc. In this chapter we provide an introduction to some cryptographic primitives
which are used to design secure applications.
1.1 Requirements for Cryptography
Cryptography is generally used in practice to provide four services: privacy, au-
thentication, data integrity and non-repudiation. The goal of privacy is to ensure
that communication between two parties remain secret. This often means that the
contents of the communication are secret, however in certain situations the very
fact that communication took place must be a secret as well. Encryption is gener-
ally used to provide privacy in modern communication. Authentication of one or
both parties during a communication is required to ensure that information is being
exchanged with the legitimate party. Passwords are common examples of one-way
authentication in which users authenticate themselves to gain access to a system.
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The modern authentication procedures are much more complex where individual
devices may need to authenticate themselves to previously unknown systems or de-
vices for communication. The goal of data integrity is to ensure that the contents of
a communication between two parties have not been altered by an attacker. Hash
functions and message authentication codes are generally used to ensure integrity of
a message. Non-repudiation is used to prevent a party from denying the existence
of a communication or a contract in future.
1.2 Cryptographic Primitives
A cryptographic primitive is a specific tool used to provide a cryptographic service.
Cryptographic primitives are used according to a well designed set of protocols
to ensure the overall system security. We can divide the cryptographic primitives
in two categories: symmetric key primitives and asymmetric key primitives. The
encryption schemes used for providing privacy are similarly divided into symmetric
key encryption and asymmetric key encryption or public key encryption.
1.2.1 Symmetric Key Encryption
In symmetric key encryption a secret key is shared between the sender and the
receiver. The word ”symmetric” refers to the fact that both sender and receiver
use the same key to encrypt and decrypt the information. The secret key must be
shared over a secure channel before the communication. Two types of cryptographic
primitives are used for symmetric key encryption: block ciphers and stream ciphers.
Block Ciphers: A block cipher is a symmetric key cryptographic primitive which
takes as input an n-bit block of plaintext and a secret key and outputs an n-bit
block of ciphertext using a fixed transformation. Figure 1.1 shows the general
structure of a block cipher. The common block sizes are 64 bits, 128 bits and 256
bits. For a fixed key the block cipher defines a permutation on the n-bit input.
The building blocks of modern block ciphers are substitutions and permutations.







Figure 1.1: General structure of a block cipher
permutations are used to diffuse the input and the key. These substitution and
permutation operations in a cipher are repeated several times to obtain a highly
nonlinear transformation of the input bits.
The two most famous block ciphers are DES (Data Encryption Standard) [31]
and AES(Advanced Encryption Standard) [26]. DES was designed in 1970 and has
been extensively used in the past three decades. It has a block size of 64 bits and a
secret key of 56 bits. AES was standardized in 2002 to replace DES since 56 bit key
is too small for the computing power of todays computers. AES has an increased
key length of 128, 192, or 256 bits and a block size of 128 bits.
Stream Ciphers: Unlike block ciphers, which encrypt large blocks of plaintext
using a fixed transformation, stream ciphers encrypt individual digits of plaintext
using a time-varying transformation. Figure 1.2 shows the general structure of a
stream cipher. The size of the digit can vary depending on the design constraints,
application and the underlying platform. A stream cipher usually consists of a
pseudo random generator. The generator takes as input a secret key and then
generates a pseudo random sequence of digits known as the running keystream.









Figure 1.2: General structure of a stream cipher
1.2.2 Public Key Encryption
Public or asymmetric key encryption uses two different keys for encryption and
decryption. The key used for the encryption is known as the public key since
everyone has access to it. Anyone can encrypt a message using this key, however the
encrypted message can only be decrypted using the private key that corresponds to
the public key used in encryption. Therefore only the person in possession of private
key can decrypt the message. The encryption process is therefore considered to be
one-way and hard to invert unless a trap door is used. This trap door is provided
by the private key. Public key encryption is very flexible however it requires the
existence of a trusted third party that can authenticate the public keys. Moreover
public key encryption schemes are very slow when compared to symmetric key
schemes and can not be used for bulk encryption. Most practical systems use a
combination of public and private key encryption. A public key scheme is first used














Figure 1.3: Synchronous stream cipher
1.3 Design of Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers are commonly subdivided into two categories: synchronous and self-
synchronizing stream ciphers. The theory of finite state machines can be used to
describe both categories of stream ciphers [109].
1.3.1 Synchronous Stream Ciphers
In synchronous stream ciphers the keystream is generated from the key indepen-
dently of the plaintext and the ciphertext. Figure 1.3 shows the general structure
of a synchronous stream cipher. Let xi, yi, zi and si be the plaintext digit, cipher-
text digit, keystream digit and the internal state of the cipher at time i. Then the
encryption process can be described by the following equations
si+1 = F (k, si) (1.1)
zi = f(k, si) (1.2)
yi = xi + zi (1.3)
where F is the next-state function and f is the output function. The ciphertext
is obtained by the bitwise addition of the keystream digit and the plaintext digit.
The ciphertext at the receiver is decrypted by producing the same keystream and




















Figure 1.4: Self-synchronous stream cipher
receiver to be perfectly synchronized. A loss of synchronization means all plaintext
digits decrypted after the loss will be in error.
1.3.2 Self-Synchronizing Stream Ciphers
In self-synchronizing stream ciphers the keystream is generated from the key as well
as a fixed number of previous ciphertext digits. Figure 1.4 shows the general struc-
ture of a self-synchronizing stream cipher. The encryption by a self-synchronous
stream cipher can be described as
si = F (yi−1, yi−2, ..., yi−v) (1.4)
zi = f(k, si) (1.5)
yi = xi + zi (1.6)
The keystream produced at time i depends on v previous ciphertext symbols.
















Figure 1.5: Combination generator
1.3.3 Classical Stream Cipher Designs
Most practical stream ciphers are based on linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs).
An LFSR of length n is an n stage register with a linear feedback function. During
its operation contents of each storage unit are shifted to the next unit and the
output of the feedback function is fed to the last storage unit. If the feedback
function of the LFSR is primitive and its initial state is a non-zero state, then
the output sequence produced by the LFSR has the maximum period of 2n − 1.
This sequence is known as the maximum-length sequence or simply m-sequence.
The m-sequences have very good randomness properties such as maximum period,
balance, ideal n-tuple distribution, ideal run distribution and ideal autocorrelation.
These properties make them ideal for use in stream ciphers. However m-sequences
have one drawback: their low linear complexity where linear complexity refers to
the length of the shortest LFSR required to generate that sequence. Berlekamp-
Massey algorithm provides an efficient way of computing the linear complexity
of a sequence. For an m-sequence of length 2n − 1 this algorithm only requires
2n consecutive symbols to determine the feedback polynomial of the LFSR and
hence the entire sequence. Therefore in practical stream cipher designs a large
linear complexity of the keystream is obtained by a nonlinear transformation of
the LFSR output sequence. These methods of transformation define three general
design categories of stream ciphers: combination generators, filter generators and
clock controlled generators. The three types of generators are shown in Figures 1.5,












Figure 1.6: Filter generator
combined by a Boolean function f to produce the keystream. To produce a random
and secure keystream the Boolean function must provide high nonlinearity and
satisfy certain criteria. We will discuss these criteria in more detail in Section 1.5.
Filter generators only use a single LFSR. The keystream is generated by filtering the
contents of the LFSR by a Boolean function. The design of filter and combination
generators using pure Boolean functions involves certain tradeoffs. Some designs
avoid these tradeoffs by using filters and combiners with memory. Two famous
examples are E0 [12] and SNOW [37].
The clock controlled generators destroy the linearity of the LFSR output by
using irregular clocking. Two popular clock controlled generators are the stop-and-
go generator and shrinking generator. In stop-and-go generator two LFSRs are
used. One is clocked regularly and its output is used to clock the second LFSR.
The output of second LFSR is the output of the generator. If the output of the
first LFSR is 1, second LFSR is clocked to produce a new symbol otherwise the
previous symbol is repeated. The shrinking generator also uses 2 LFSRs. Instead of
controlling the clocking of the second LFSR, one LFSR is used to shrink the output
of the second LFSR. If the output of the first LFSR is 1 second LFSR produces
an output symbol, otherwise the output symbol is discarded. Some stream cipher
designs combine irregular clocking with a filter or a combination generator for
example LILI 128 [16,30].






Figure 1.7: Clock controlled generator
ciphers which do not use LFSR as a component. RC4 is a very famous stream
cipher which falls into this category. The internal state of the cipher consists of a
permutation of 256 elements, numbered from 0 to 255, which changes with time.
The keystream is generated by selecting an element as an output from the state
randomly. Most of these stream ciphers are word oriented i.e. output several bits
in each cycle and have been specifically designed for software applications.
1.3.4 Standardization of Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers have been used in many information processing applications. The
three significant ones are A5/1 [16] in GSM networks, E0 [12] in bluetooth standard
and RC4 [106] in WEP (802.11 wireless LAN standard). However practical attacks
have been discovered on all three encryption schemes [73,110,49].
Two major standardization efforts that included stream ciphers were the NESSIE
(New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption) project [89]
and the International Standards Organization’s ISO/IEC 18033 standard. Various
cryptographic primitives including a block cipher were standardized in the NESSIE
project. However all the stream cipher proposals submitted to NESSIE were re-
jected due to the discovery of cryptanalytic attacks. The ISO/IEC 18033 standard
on the other hand selected two stream ciphers: SNOW 2.0 [38] and MUGI [114].
In 2005 a new project, eSTREAM, was launched by ECRYPT (European Net-
work of Excellence for Cryptology) [36]. This is by far the largest effort ever under-































One round of AES-128
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Figure 1.8: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-128
invited to submit stream cipher proposals in two categories: High performance
software applications and hardware applications with restricted resources. These
submissions have been subjected to rigorous cryptanalysis and have resulted in the
enhancement of our understanding of stream cipher design. The final report of the
project is expected in January 2008. The WG stream cipher presented in Chapter 3
is one of the submissions to eSTREAM project.
1.4 Design of Block Ciphers
The encryption process in block ciphers consists of transforming the data in several
rounds of operations. Each round consists of two major operations: nonlinear
transformation to add confusion and linear transformation to add diffusion to the
input bits. In addition to this block ciphers have a key scheduling algorithm which
expands a secret key into several round keys. Figure 1.8 shows the high level design
of block cipher AES-128. The cipher has a key scheduling algorithm that takes
128-bit secret key as an input and expands it into eleven 128-bit round keys. The
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encryption part of the algorithm consists of ten rounds. All rounds are identical
except the last round which is slightly different. For more details on the design
of AES please refer to [26]. The nonlinear transformation in each round consists
of several substitution boxes (or S-boxes). The 128-bit input to each round is
first divided into 16 byte sized chunks each of which is then transformed by a
nonlinear S-box. This is followed by a linear transformation of the entire 128-bit
block followed by the addition of the round key. The S-boxes constitute the only
nonlinear transformation in the AES-128. This is true for most block ciphers.
1.5 Nonlinear Transformations in Cipher Design
Nonlinear transformations are at the heart of symmetric cipher design. The non-
linear transformations usually consist of Boolean functions and S-boxes. In some
ciphers simple processor operations are used to create a highly nonlinear transfor-
mation.
Stream Ciphers: Most shift register based stream ciphers use nonlinear Boolean
functions to filter the shift register’s output. Some word oriented design also use S-
boxes, i.e., vector Boolean functions. Others use popular bitwise operations (such as
shift, rotate, AND and XOR etc) found on modern processors to obtain a nonlinear
transformation.
Block Ciphers: Almost all block ciphers use S-boxes to introduce nonlinearity
in the input bits. In some designs S-boxes with compact algebraic representations
are used whereas in other designs they are chosen randomly according to a fixed
criteria.
Boolean Functions: The Boolean functions used in stream ciphers must satisfy
certain properties to ensure resistance against various attacks. A Boolean function
must have high algebraic degree, high nonlinearity and good correlation immunity
to prevent various types of correlation attacks. It must also have high algebraic
immunity to provide resistance against the algebraic attacks.
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S-Boxes: S-boxes are primarily used in block ciphers and are required to provide
resistance against linear and differential cryptanalysis. As a result of the alge-
braic attacks it is desirable to have S-boxes which do not satisfy very low degree
multivariate equations involving input and output bits.
1.6 Algebraic Attacks
The concept of algebraic attacks is not new however it has only been used recently
to attack practical ciphers. The idea is to use the plaintext, ciphertext pairs and
the structure of the cipher to derive a system of linear or nonlinear equations in
terms of the unknown key. The system can then be solved to recover the key. The
feasibility of the attack depends on the size and nature of the system of equations.
Several stream ciphers with high resistance to correlation and other attacks were
successfully attacked in [20,21,75,5]. However these attacks have been less successful
against popular block ciphers and are somewhat controversial. Still these attacks
have demonstrated that most of the popular block ciphers can be easily reduced to
a system of low degree multivariate equations. The difficulty of solving such system
is not very clear at the moment. Complexity or success of algebraic attacks against
a block or stream cipher depends heavily on the nonlinear transformation(s) used
in that cipher.
1.6.1 Boolean Functions and Algebraic Attacks
The success of the algebraic attacks against many LFSR based stream ciphers is
due to the discovery by Courtois et. al, that the Boolean functions used in these
ciphers have an undesirable property: the algebraic degree of these functions can
be reduced by multiplying them with appropriate low degree functions. In order to
understand the complete attack we consider a nonlinear filter generator shown in
Figure 1.9 with a binary LFSR of length n and Boolean function of algebraic degree
d. The generator is loaded with an n bit key, k, and it produces a keystream, z. We
assume that the attacker has access to a segment of keystream z and his goal is to










Figure 1.9: Algebraic attack on filter generator
of the LFSR is linear the state update function consists of a linear transformation
L. The contents of the LFSR are filtered by a nonlinear function f to produce the
keystream. Since L, z, and f are known, for each keystream digit zi we can write
a nonlinear equation, i.e.,
f(k) + z0 = 0
f(L(k)) + z1 = 0
f(L2(k)) + z2 = 0
· · · · · ·
(1.7)
The only unknown in the above equations is the secret key k. However this is a
system of nonlinear equations and there are no efficient techniques for solving such
systems. One solution is to first linearize the system by replacing all the monomial
terms with degree 2 or higher with new variables. This will result in a system
of linear equations which can easily be solved by algorithms such as Gaussian
Elimination. To obtain a solvable system, there must be as many equations as
the number of unknown variables. The number of monomial terms in n variables








. This is the complexity of the attack and for a fixed n depends
on the algebraic degree d of the Boolean function.
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Courtois showed in [20] that this complexity can be reduced if we can find low
degree multiple of function f , i.e., if we can find a Boolean function g such that
product f×g has degree less than deg(f), where deg(f) is the degree of function f .
Consider the nonlinear equation f(Li(k)) = 0; the overall degree of the equation is
deg(f). If we multiply this equation by g we get f(Li(k))× g = 0. Since the degree
of f × g < deg(f), the overall degree of the new equation is lower than deg(f).
Therefore the newer equation has fewer monomial terms and the complexity of
solving the linearized system is reduced.
1.6.2 S-Boxes and Algebraic Attacks
The algebraic attacks against block ciphers also come from the observation that
the S-boxes used in most block ciphers have an interesting algebraic property: they
can be expressed as an overdefined system of low degree multivariate algebraic
equations. Therefore by expressing all the S-boxes in a block cipher by low degree
multivariate equations, and expressing the linear transformations as linear multi-
variate equations we can reduce the entire block cipher to a system of low degree
algebraic equations. The solution of this system recovers the secret key of the ci-
pher. For example consider block cipher AES-128 as shown in Figure 1.8. The
encryption algorithm consists of 160 identical S-boxes. Each S-box has 8 binary
inputs and 8 binary outputs and can be expressed by 23 multivariate quadratic
equations. If each binary input and output of an S-box is represented as a binary
variable, we can obtain 16 × 23 = 3680 quadratic equations in 160 × 16 = 2560
variables. Similarly there are eleven 128 bit to 128 bit linear transformation layers
in AES which give us 11×128 = 1408 linear equations. Now we have an overdefined
system of quadratic equations the solution of which recovers the key. However the
exact complexity of solving such systems of algebraic equations is not known. There
are several algorithms that have been shown to solve small systems of quadratic
equations but they are based on heuristics and it is not known how well they scale
to large systems [25, 39, 40]. Still the property that most block ciphers can easily
be reduced to a simple but large system of quadratic equations is undesirable. We
will address this issue in Chapter 6.
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1.7 Thesis Overview
This thesis is about the design of symmetric ciphers, in particular stream ciphers,
and the analysis of the cryptographic properties of the nonlinear transformations
used in these ciphers. The thesis is organized as follows.
We begin the thesis with an introduction to symmetric cryptography and brief
review of the combinatorial objects used in the design of block and stream ciphers.
In Chapter 2 we present the definitions that will be used in this thesis. In Chapter 3
we present WG, a family of new stream ciphers designed to obtain a keystream
with guaranteed randomness properties. We review the cryptographic properties of
the WG sequences and investigate the feasibility of constructing a practical stream
cipher based on these sequences. We show how to obtain a mathematical description
of a WG stream cipher for the desired randomness properties and security level,
and then how to translate this description into a practical hardware design. We
analyze the security of our design against various attacks and list the cryptanalysis
that has been performed on WG so far.
In Chapter 4 we describe the design of a new RC4-like stream cipher suitable
for high speed software applications. The attacks on the original RC4 stream
ciphers are reviewed and its performance limitations on modern 32/64 bit processors
is examined. This is followed by a new RC4-like stream cipher proposal which
attempts to exploit the 32/64 bit architecture of the modern processors. Finally
we present the distinguishing attacks and countermeasures proposed on our design
so far.
The second part of this thesis closely examines the algebraic immunity of Boolean
functions and S-boxes based on power mappings. We begin Chapter 5 by devel-
oping techniques to analyze Boolean functions based on power mappings in finite
fields. We then use these techniques to derive meaningful upper bounds on the
algebraic immunity of cryptographically significant functions, i.e., functions based
on inverse, Kasami, Niho, and Dobbertin exponents. We show that for large input
sizes these functions have very low algebraic immunity. Finally these results are
generalized, first to monomial trace functions, and then to all polynomial functions.
In Chapter 6 we turn our attention to the algebraic immunity of S-boxes based
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on power mappings as they are widely used in modern block ciphers such as AES.
We first develop efficient techniques to count the number of bi-affine and quadratic
equations satisfied by S-boxes based on power mappings. From these techniques we
develop two algorithms and analyze various classes of S-boxes used in the design
of block and stream ciphers. This is followed by the construction of S-boxes that
satisfy zero or very small number of quadratic equations. Finally we examine these
S-boxes for their resistance against linear and differential attacks and provide a
list of S-boxes based on power mappings that offer high resistance against linear,
differential, and algebraic attacks.
In Chapter 7 we study algebraic structure of S-boxes used in AES and DES by
deriving their equivalent algebraic descriptions. We use these descriptions to deter-
mine the number of monomials in their polynomial and trace representations, and
linear complexity of the sequences that correspond to their component functions.
We conclude this thesis in Chapter 8 by summarizing the significance of our work.




In this chapter we provide definitions and necessary preliminary material that will
be used in the thesis. Most of the definitions and concepts provided in this chapter
can be found in [52,67,65].
2.1 Finite Fields
• F2 = GF (2) is the finite field with 2 elements: 0 and 1.
• F2n = GF (2n) is the extension field of GF (2) with 2n elements.
• Fn2 is the vector space over F2 with a set of all binary n-tuples.
• Zn is the ring of integers modulo n.
Trace Function: For positive integers n and m, let m | n, then the trace function,






, x ∈ F2n .
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Polynomial Basis: Consider the finite field F2m and let α be a root of the primitive
polynomial that generates F2m . Then {1, α, α2, · · ·, αm−1} is a polynomial basis of
F2m over F2.
Normal Basis: Consider the finite field F2m and let γ be an element of F2m such
that {γ, γ21 , γ22 , · · ·, γ2m−1} is a basis of F2m over F2. Then {γ, γ21 , γ22 , · · ·, γ2m−1}
is a normal basis of F2m over F2.
Cyclotomic Coset: A cyclotomic coset Cs modulo 2
n − 1 is defined as
Cs = {s, s · 2, · · · , s · 2ns−1},
where ns is the smallest positive integer such that s ≡ s2nsmod (2n − 1). The
subscript s is chosen as the smallest integer in Cs, and s is called the coset leader
of Cs. The computations of cosets are performed in Z2n−1, the residue integer
ring modulo (2n − 1). For example the cyclotomic cosets modulo 15 are: C0 =
{0}, C1 = {1, 2, 4, 8}, C3 = {3, 6, 12, 9}, C5 = {5, 10}, C7 = {7, 14, 13, 11}, where
{0,1,3,5,7} are coset leaders modulo 15.
Hamming Weight: The Hamming weight of an integer i is the number of nonzero
coefficients in the binary representation of i and is denoted by H(i).
2.2 Boolean Functions
We consider the domain of an n-variable Boolean function to be the vector space
(Fn2 , +) over F2, where + is used to denote the addition operator over both F2 and
the vector space Fn2 = {x1, x2, · · · , xn|xi ∈ F2} and n is a positive integer.
Algebraic Normal Form: Any Boolean function has a unique representation as
a multivariate polynomial over F2, called the algebraic normal form (ANF),






ai,jxixj + . . . + a1,2,...,nx1x2 . . . xn,
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where the coefficients a0, ai, ai,j, . . . , a1,2,...,n ∈ F2.
Algebraic Degree: The algebraic degree, deg(h), of a Boolean function h is the
number of variables in the highest order term with non zero coefficient.
Affine Function: An n variable function l is called affine if it is of the form
l(x1, . . . , xn) = a0 +
∑
1≤i≤n aixi where the coefficients a0, ai ∈ F2. If a0 = 0, the
function is called linear.
Walsh Transform: The Walsh transform (WT) of an n-variable Boolean function





(−1)h(w)⊕〈u,w〉, u ∈ Fn2 . (2.1)
{Wh(u)|u ∈ Fn2} is called the spectrum of h. Note that Walsh transform of h(x) is
actually the Fourier transform of (−1)h(x).
Nonlinearity: Nonlinearity of a Boolean function h measures the distance of the
Boolean function from the set of all affine functions. The nonlinearity nl(h) of an
n-variable Boolean function h, can be written as





Boolean functions used in stream ciphers must have high nonlinearity. A high
nonlinearity weakens the correlation between the input and output and prevents
the attacker from using using linear approximations of the function.
Correlation Immunity: Let X1, X2, ..., Xn be independent binary random vari-
ables with equal probability of 0 and 1. A Boolean function h(x1, x2, ..., xn) is said
to be t-th order correlation immune, if for each subset of t variables Xi1 , Xi2 , ..., Xit
with 1 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 · · · ≤ it ≤ n, the random variable Z = h(X1, X2, ..., Xn) is sta-
tistically independent of the random vector (Xi1 , Xi2 , ..., Xit). A Boolean function
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which is t-th order correlation immune and is also balanced is called t-th resilient.
The Boolean function used in a nonlinear combiner must have high correlation
immunity. If the combiner function is not correlation immune then the attacker
can find correlations between the keystream and the contents of one of the LFSRs.
This allows the attacker to mount a divide and conquer attack in which internal
state of each LFSR is recovered independent of the other LFSRs.
2.3 Polynomial Functions:
Any non-zero polynomial function f : F2n → F2, can be represented as a sum of






n−1, Ak ∈ F2nk , A2n−1 ∈ F2,
where Γ(n) is the set consisting of all coset leaders modulo 2n − 1, nk is the size of
the coset Ck, and Tr
nk






k), Ak ∈ F2nk , x ∈ F2n . (2.2)
Algebraic Degree: The algebraic degree of a polynomial function, f , denoted by
deg(f), is given by the largest w such that Ak 6= 0 and H(k) = w.
Correspondence Between Boolean and Polynomial Functions: There is
a natural correspondence between Boolean functions h and polynomial functions
f [52, page 334]. Let {α0, . . . , αn−1} be a basis for F2n , then this correspondence is
given by:
h(x0, . . . , xn−1) = f(x), x =
n−1∑
i=0
xiαi, xi ∈ F2.
Monomial Function: A monomial or single trace term function is a function from
F2n → F2 that can be represented by a single trace term, f(x) = Trn1 (βxt) where
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β ∈ F2n and t is the coset leader of Ct.
Discrete Fourier Transform [52] : For f : F2n → F2, the Discrete Fourier




[f(x) + f(0)]x−k, k = 0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1.
The sequence (A)=Ak is also called the spectral sequence. The inverse DFT formula





k, x ∈ F∗2n .
Therefore given the output of the function f we can compute its polynomial repre-
sentation.
2.4 S-Boxes
An (n,m) S-box (or vector Boolean function) is a map F : Fn2 → Fm2 and has
component Boolean functions f1, · · · , fm.
Algebraic Degree: We define the degree of an (n,m) S-box, F , to be the minimum
of the degrees of all non zero linear combinations of its component functions.
Nonlinearity: Nonlinearity of an (n, m) S-box is defined as the minimum nonlin-
earity of all the non zero linear combinations of its component functions.
An S-box used in a block cipher must have high nonlinearity to prevent linear
cryptanalysis. In linear cryptanalysis an attacker exploits the probabilistic linear
relations between the input and output of an S-box. If the nonlinearity of an S-
box is low then these relations hold with high probability which leads to linear
approximation of the cipher that is used to recover the secret key. On the other
hand an S-box with high nonlinearity weakens these probabilistic relations and
make linear cryptanalysis very hard.
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Maximally Nonlinear: Let F2n be the finite field with 2n elements. Consider a
mapping F : F2n → F2n . If n is odd F is called maximally nonlinear [34] if the
Walsh spectra of all nonzero linear combinations of its component functions have
precisely 3 values {0,±2n+12 }. If n is even then it is conjectured [34] that maximum
achievable nonlinearity by F is 2n−1− 2n2 . If F achieves this nonlinearity then it is
called maximally nonlinear.
Differentially k-Uniform: A mapping F : F2n → F2n is called differentially k-
uniform [95] if each equation
F (x + a)− F (x) = b, where a ∈ F2n , a 6= 0, b ∈ F2n ,
has at most k solutions in F2n .
For a differentially k-uniform S-box used in a block cipher, k must be low to ensure
resistance against differential cryptanalysis. Differential cryptanalysis exploits the
scenario where a particular input difference to an S-box leads to a particular output
difference with high probability. It is clear from the definition above that if k is high
such a difference will always exist. Note that k is always even and the minimum
value of k is 2.
Almost Perfect Nonlinear (APN): F is called almost perfect nonlinear (APN)
if it is differentially 2-uniform. [34]. It is known that if n is odd and F is maximally
nonlinear then F is APN [17].





i, bi ∈ F2n .
Given the evaluation of F (i) at all the 2n inputs where i = 0, 1, · · · , 2n−1, its poly-
nomial representation can be computed by computing the polynomial coefficients




F (0), i = 0∑
α∈F2n F (α)α
−i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n − 1
The above formula only holds if F (0) = 0. If F (0) 6= 0 then we can represent the
function in polynomial form as F (x) =
∑2n−1
i=0 dix






F (0), i = 0∑
α∈F2n F (α)α
−i, 0 < i < 2n − 1
b2n−1 + F (0), i = 2n − 1
2.5 Sequences
Binary Sequence: a = {ai}, ai ∈ F2, is a binary sequence over F2.
Periodic Sequences and Polynomial Functions: Let S be the set of all binary
sequences with period N | (2n − 1) and F be the set of all polynomial functions
from F2n to F2. Then for any sequence a = {ai} ∈ S there exists a polynomial
function f(x) in F such that
ai = f(α
i), i = 0, 1, 2, · · · ,
where α is the primitive element of F2n . Note that f(x) is called the trace repre-
sentation of a.
m-sequence: If f(x) is a single trace term function with exponent t relatively
prime to n, then its corresponding sequence is called an m-sequence, i.e.,
a = Trn1 (βα
i) i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , β ∈ F∗2n .
Note that m-sequence has period 2n− 1 and is generated by an n stage LFSR with
a primitive feedback polynomial and a non-zero initial state.
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Autocorrelation of Binary Sequences: Let a be a periodic binary sequence




(−1)ai+ai+τ , 0 ≤ τ ≤ N − 1
If the autocorrelation function of the sequence a is
Ca(τ) =
{
N, if τ ≡ 0 mod N
−1, otherwise
then a is said to have ideal two-level autocorrelation.
From a cryptographic view point two-level autocorrelation ensures that the attacker
can not find correlations between shifted versions of the same keystream. The def-
inition given above is for periodic autocorrelation however in a stream cipher the
length of the keystream used is only a fraction of the total period. In that situation
the attacker can only compute aperiodic autocorrelation. Analyzing aperiodic au-
tocorrelation is a hard problem and it is believed that sequences with good periodic
autocorrelation also have good aperiodic autocorrelation.
Orthogonal Functions: Let f(x) be a polynomial function from F2n to F2 with






0, if λ 6= 1
2n, if λ = 1
where λ ∈ F2n , then we say that f(x) is orthogonal over F. If f(x) is the trace rep-
resentation of a binary sequence a of period 2n−1 and Ca(τ) is the autocorrelation
function of a then Cf (λ) and Ca(τ) are related as follows
Cf (λ) = 1 + Ca(τ)
where λ = ατ . Also the trace representation of a binary sequence of period 2n − 1
with ideal two-level autocorrelation is an orthogonal function.
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Linear Complexity of Binary Sequences: The linear complexity, LC, of a
binary sequence is defined as the size in bits of the shortest LFSR required to
generate that sequence.
The Berlekamp-Massey algorithm provides an efficient way of computing the linear
complexity of a sequence [72]. For an m-sequence of length 2n − 1 this algorithm
only requires 2n consecutive symbols to determine the feedback polynomial of the
LFSR and hence the entire sequence. Therefore the keystream produced by a
stream cipher must have large linear complexity.
Runs of Ones: For a binary string, λ consecutive ones (1’s) preceded by zero and
followed by zero is called a run of ones of length λ. We consider the runs of ones to





In this chapter we present WG family of stream ciphers which have designed ran-
domness properties. The design of WG guarantees a keystream with ideal two-level
autocorrelation, balance, long period, ideal tuple distribution, and high and exact
linear complexity. We discuss how these properties are achieved by the proposed
design and show how to select various parameters to obtain a stream cipher for
the desired security level and efficient implementation. The security of WG against
time/memory/data tradeoff attacks, algebraic attacks and correlation attacks, is
evaluated. Finally we present WG-128 [87] as a concrete example of a WG stream
cipher with a key size of 128 bits.
3.1 Background
Traditionally many hardware oriented stream ciphers have been built using linear
feedback shift registers (LFSRs) and Boolean functions with compact Algebraic
Normal Forms (ANFs). This allowed for a very small and efficient implementation
in hardware. However following the discovery of algebraic attacks [20, 21, 75, 5],
using Boolean functions with compact ANFs is no longer secure. One way to
defeat the algebraic attacks is to use nonlinear feedback shift registers (NFSRs) or
more generally, update the state of the stream cipher nonlinearly. Many hardware
oriented stream ciphers in the eSTREAM project including F-FCSR, Grain, Mickey,
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and Trivium, have been designed according to this approach [36]. Whereas the tools
to analyze the LFSR based stream cipher designs are well developed, the same is
not true for NFSRs. Some results exist for a class of NFSR’s known as feedback
with carry shift registers (FCSR) [61, 62, 63] but their use in the design of stream
ciphers is relatively new. Therefore the security of most of these stream ciphers
rely on the difficulty of analyzing the design itself. An alternative approach is
to design a stream cipher in such a way that it is very easy to analyze. This
allows the designers to explicitly prove various security properties of the design.
The WG family of stream ciphers have been designed using this approach. To
defeat the algebraic attacks on LFSR based stream ciphers, WG relies on nonlinear
Boolean functions with large number of inputs, high degree and complex ANF
forms. To overcome the implementation complexity of the Boolean function it has
been designed in polynomial form instead of ANF form. Implementation of such
functions require small finite field multipliers. This results in a moderate increase
in the hardware requirements, however the design is still practical.
A WG stream cipher consists of a WG keystream generator which produces
a long pseudo-random keystream. The keystream is XORed with the plaintext to
produce the ciphertext. From here onwards we will focus on the design and random-
ness properties of the WG keystream generators. The WG keystream generators
use Welch-Gong(WG) transformations as the filtering functions. The WG transfor-
mations have very large ANFs and can be implemented in polynomial form using
finite field arithmetic. These transformations correspond to the WG transformation
sequences that were discovered by Golomb, Gong, and Gaal in 1998 [94]. In 2002,
Gong and Youssef presented several cryptographic properties of WG transforma-
tion sequences. These properties make them an ideal candidate for cryptographic
use.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we first show that it is im-
practical to use WG transformation sequence generators from [54,94] as keystream
generators in practical stream ciphers. We then examine the possibility of using
a small WG transformation as a filtering function in a nonlinear filter to build a
keystream generator. In Section 3.3 we show which cryptographic properties of the
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WG transformation sequences can be preserved in this design. For the properties
that can not be preserved completely we list the possible tradeoffs. Then we show
how various parameters of the designs can be selected to design WG stream ciphers
for various security levels and application requirements. Finally in Section 3.5 we
present WG-128, as a concrete example of a WG keystream generator with a secret
key of size 128 bits. Note that WG-128 is a slightly modified version of the WG
stream cipher which is a phase 2 candidate in profile 2 of the ECRYPT stream
cipher project: eSTREAM [36].
3.2 WG Transformation and Stream Ciphers
3.2.1 WG Transformation
In this section we give a formal definition of WG transformation taken from [94].
Let n 6= 0 mod 3, and t(x) = x + xq1 + xq2 + xq3 + xq4 , x ∈ F2n , where qi’s are
defined as:




2k−1 + 2k−1 + 1,
q3 = 2
2k−1 − 2k−1 + 1,
q4 = 2
2k−1 + 2k − 1,
(3.1)




2k−2 + 2k−1 + 1,
q3 = 2
2k−2 − 2k−1 + 1,
q4 = 2




f(x) = Tr(t(x + 1) + 1), x ∈ F2n (3.3)
is called the WG transformation. Note that f(x) is a function from F2n → F2. Let
α be a primitive element of F2n . Let w = wi where
wi = f(α
i) = Tr(t(αi + 1) + 1), i = 0, 1, . . .
Then w is called a WG sequence.
In [54] Gong et al. discussed various cryptographic properties of the binary
WG sequence w. The WG sequence has period 2n − 1, is balanced and has ideal
two-level autocorrelation. The linear complexity of the WG sequence (n(2dn/3e −
3)) increases exponentially with n and its cross correlation with an m-sequence is
only three valued. Furthermore if the basis used for computation of the sequence
in F2n is chosen properly, the Boolean function that corresponds to the the WG
transformation is also 1-resilient, i.e., the output of the WG transformation is not
correlated to any single input. Note that it is very difficult to design sequences
which have all the above cryptographic properties. Therefore the WG sequences
are well-suited for use as pseudo-random sequences in cryptography.
3.2.2 Practical Stream Cipher Design
Despite its cryptographic properties, generating WG sequence w is not very efficient
when it comes to practical cryptographic applications such as stream ciphers. Most
cryptographic applications require a secret key to be at least 128 bits. Also there
is a consensus among the designers of stream ciphers that the internal state of
the cipher must at least be twice the size of the secret key. This would require a
WG sequence generator to have an internal state of 256 bits. From Eqn. (3.3) it is
evident that a straight forward implementation of the WG sequence generator would
require computations in F2256 making it highly inefficient. In [54], the authors also
mentioned the possibility of using the WG transformation as a combining function
in combinatorial function generator or as a filtering function in filtering generator.
















Figure 3.1: Block diagram of WG keystream generator
must be answered to evaluate the security and performance of such generators:
• Is it possible to design the generator such that its output sequence has cryp-
tographic properties similar to those of WG sequence w?
• Which properties of the WG sequence can be preserved completely and for
the properties that can not be preserved completely what are the possible
tradeoffs?
• Can such generators provide the security and efficiency expected of a stream
cipher?
In this chapter we answer the above questions for a filter generator which uses WG
transformation as the filtering function. We show that by using a non-binary LFSR
and a small WG transformation, we can design a practical keystream generator that
can be used as a stream cipher. We also show how to choose the design parameters
to ensure that the generator has cryptographic properties of the WG sequence.
3.3 WG Keystream Generator Family
We first give an overview of the WG keystream generator family. A WG keystream
generator can be regarded as a nonlinear filter (see Figure 3.1). It consists of an
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l stage LFSR with a primitive feedback polynomial over F2m . The LFSR gener-
ates a maximal length sequence over F2m which is filtered by a, F2m → F2, WG
transformation to generate the binary keystream. This simple design generates a
keystream which has period 2n−1, where n = lm and is easy to analyze for various
cryptographic properties. If the feedback polynomial of the LFSR and the param-
eters of the WG transformation are selected appropriately, the generator will be
efficient and the keystream will inherit most cryptographic properties of the WG
transformation sequence w.
3.3.1 WG Parameter Selection
In this section we show how to select various parameters of the WG keystream
generator. First we give a list of all the parameters and their relation to the desired
cryptographic properties. Then we outline the algorithms to find these parameters.
• For the F2m → F2 WG transformation, m 6= 0 mod 3 (see the definition of
WG transformation in Section 3.2).
• The efficiency of the WG keystream generator and most of its cryptographic
properties depend on the basis chosen for the computation of the WG trans-
form. Computation of t(x) (Eqn. (3.3)) in the WG transformation involves
exponentiations in F2m . If the field elements are represented in normal basis,
then raising an element to a power of 2 is as simple as a cyclic shift. Since
the exponents in t(x) involves such computations using normal basis is more
efficient than polynomial basis.
• The complexity of computing the WG transformation mainly resides in the
multiplications in F2m . The hardware implementation of a normal basis mul-
tiplier in F2m depends on the basis used to represent the field elements. The
normal basis for which the hardware complexity of the normal basis multi-
plier is minimum is known as the optimal normal basis (ONB). Using ONB
can further improve the hardware efficiency of the generator, however, this
requirement may not always be fulfilled as ONB do not exist for every m.
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Also note that the generator can always be implemented using a polynomial
basis although it may increase the implementation complexity.
• It must be ensured that for the selected basis, the Boolean function that cor-
responds to the WG transformation is at least 1-order resilient. Otherwise a
different basis must be selected to ensure the resiliency of WG transformation.
• The most distinguishing feature of the WG keystream generator is the periodic
two-level autocorrelation of its keystream. It is known that this property of
the WG transform sequence w is inherited by the WG keystream generator.
Here we reproduce the proof for completeness. Let {ai} be the output of the
generator:
ai = f(bi), i = 0, 1, . . . and
u(x) = f ◦ Trnm(x),
(3.4)
where u(x) is the composition of Trnm(x) and f . Note that {bi} is the m-
sequence generated by the LFSR over F2m with the trace representation
Trmn (x) and f is the WG transformation. It is known [52] that if f is an or-
thogonal function then the sequence that corresponds to u has two-level auto-
correlation. Since the WG transformation f is an orthogonal function [94,32]
the keystream generated by the generator has periodic two-level autocorre-
lation. To ensure that the keystream has this property the finite field com-
putations (in F2m) in the feedback polynomial of the LFSR and the WG
transformation must use the same basis.
• The linear complexity of the keystream depends on two parameters: n and
m. Therefore n and m must be selected to ensure that linear complexity is
sufficiently high. The exact formula for the linear complexity and tradeoff
between n and m are discussed in Section 3.3.5.
• Some general restrictions that apply to all keystream generators must also be
met. For example the size of the internal state should be at least twice the
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size of the secret key. The algebraic degree of the filtering function and its
algebraic immunity must be high to prevent algebraic attacks and so on.
Now we show how to find various parameters and design a secure and efficient
WG keystream generator.
3.3.2 Finding Optimal Normal Basis in F2m
The number of normal bases in an extension field is usually quite large and therefore
one basis can be found easily. Here we provide an outline of an algorithm to find
an Optimal Normal Basis (ONB) in F2m . First we state the following fact:
Fact 1 [79]. Let δ be a primitive (2m + 1)th root of unity in F22m and γ = δ + δ−1.
If 2 is primitive in Z2m+1 or 2m + 1 is a prime congruent to 3 modulo 4 and 2
generates the quadratic residues in Z2m+1 then γ is an element of the subfield F2m




, · · ·, γ2m−1] is an ONB of the subfield F2m. We select the ONB
through the following steps:
• Construct the finite field, F22m , defined by a primitive polynomial of degree
2m over F2. Let α be the root of this polynomial. Find a primitive (2m+1)st
root of unity, δ, in this field and compute δ−1. Now γ = δ + δ−1.
• We have γ in F22m . According to Fact 1, γ also belongs to F2m . In order to
map γ to this subfield we define d = 2
2m−1
2m−1 and η = α
d. Then η is a primitive
element of F2m .





g(x) is a polynomial of degree m over F2. Use g(x) as the defining polynomial
of F2m . Let β be the primitive root of g(x). Now we only need to define γ in
terms of β.
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• To find γ in terms of β we need the following computation in F22m . Find i,
{i | γ = ηi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m− 2}. Once we know the desired i we can write γ = βi
in F2m .
• The ONB is now simply given as {γ, γ21 , γ22 , · · ·, γ2m−1}.
3.3.3 Resiliency of WG Transformation
The Boolean function that corresponds to the WG transformation depends on the
basis used for the computation of WG transformation. To find the basis that give
a resilient Boolean function we refer to [54]. First define the following terms:
Let c = e−1 mod 2m − 1, where e = 22t − 2t + 1, for 3t = 1 mod m. Let
D = {x ∈ F∗2m | Trn1 (xc) = 0}. (3.6)
where F∗2m is the multiplicative group of F2m . Also let
Rγ = {(Trm1 (λγ0), · · · , (Trm1 (λγm−1)) ∈ F2m | λ ∈ D} (3.7)
where (γ0, γ1, · · · , γm−1) is a basis of F2m . Note that this basis is the same as
selected in Section 3.3.2. ONB is chosen for an efficient implementation however
the generator can be designed using a different basis as well. Now the necessary
condition for the resiliency of WG transformation is given in the following fact.
Fact 2 [54]. Let f(x) be the Boolean form of the WG transformation f(x). Then
f(x) is r-resilient if and only if all vectors in Wr = {w | 1 ≤ H(w) ≤ r} appear in
Rα, i.e., Wr ⊂ Rγ.
Since our design is a simple nonlinear filter, 1-order resiliency is sufficient for
the WG transformation. To check whether a selected basis {γ0, γ1, · · · , γm−1} gives
a Boolean function with 1-order resiliency, start by computing the set D. Note that
|D| = 2m−1 − 1. For each member of D compute the m-bit vector from Eqn. (3.7)
which gives the set Rγ. If set Rγ contains all m-bit distinct vectors with Hamming
weight exactly 1, the Boolean form of the WG transformation is 1-order resilient.
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Otherwise discard the selected basis, select a new basis and check the resiliency of
the WG transformation under the new basis. Repeat the procedure until a proper
basis is found. It must be noted that since m is small and the number of bases
for which WG transformation is resilient is very large, finding a proper basis is not
difficult.
3.3.4 Selection of LFSR Feedback Polynomial
The LFSR feedback polynomial should be a primitive polynomial of degree l over
F2m . For the keystream to have two-level autocorrelation property, the computa-
tions in the feedback polynomial must be in the same basis as the WG transfor-
mation. To ensure the above we select the feedback polynomial in the following
way:
• Construct F2m from the defining polynomial g(x), where β is the root of g(x).
• γ defines the basis selected above and is therefore known. Pick a polynomial
of degree l with constant term as γ and all the other coefficients as either
0 or 1. Check if the selected polynomial is primitive over F2m . If not try a
different polynomial until a primitive polynomial is found.
3.3.5 Achieving Desired Linear Complexity
As shown in Eqn. (3.4), the keystream of the generator can be regarded as compo-
sition of the WG transformation and an m-sequence. Sequences generated in such
manner are also known as generalized GMW sequences [52]. The linear complexity
of the generalized GMW sequences can be determined exactly (see [52, page 66]).







where I = I1 ∪ I2 and for m = 3k − 1,
I1 = {22k−1 + 2k−1 + 2 + i |0 ≤ i ≤ 2k−1 − 3},
I2 = {22k + 3 + 2i |0 ≤ i ≤ 2k−1 − 2},
and for m = 3k − 2
I1 = {2k−1 + 2 + i |0 ≤ i ≤ 2k−1 − 3},
I2 = {22k−1 + 2k−1 + 2 + i |0 ≤ i ≤ 2k−1 − 3}.
Let LCWGK be the linear complexity of the WG keystream generator then from





The linear complexity of the WG keystream generator is less than the linear com-
plexity of the WG transformation sequence with period 2n − 1. Some linear com-
plexity is sacrificed by using a smaller WG transformation(i.e., F2m → F2 instead
of F2n → F2) to achieve an efficient implementation. Note that linear complexity of
the WG keystream generator depends on n and m. If m, which determines the size
of WG transformation is fixed, linear complexity can be increased by increasing the
number of stages in the LFSR and vice versa.
3.3.6 Internal State and Degree of WG Transformation
To provide security against common attacks on stream ciphers, the keystream gen-
erator must meet some additional conditions. If K is the size of the secret key in
bits, then to provide protection against time/memory/data tradeoff attacks, the
size of the internal state (or length of LFSR in bits) must be at least 2K, i.e.,
n ≥ 2K. To provide protection against algebraic attacks the algebraic degree of
the WG transformation should be sufficiently high and it must not have any low
degree approximations [23]. The algebraic degree of the WG transformation in m
variables is given by dm/3e+ 1. Then according to [23] the complexity of the alge-
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braic attack that recovers the secret key K of the WG generator is approximately
7/64 · ( ndm/3e+1
)log27 word operations. Therefore n and m must be chosen to keep
this complexity sufficiently high. However note that if a low degree approximation
of the WG transformation is found, the complexity of the algebraic attack will be
reduced. A meaningful low degree approximation of the WG transformation means
an approximation with degree less than the degree of WG transformation itself. We
have experimantally verified that WG transformations in 11, 13 and 14 variables
(which have algebraic degrees 5, 6 and 6 respectively) do not have low any degree
approximations. Note that the degree of the WG transformation is significantly less
than m. Therefore from the assertion made in [75] and our experimental results, on
WG transformation in 11, 13 and 14 variables, we conjecture that the probability
of the existence of such low degree approximation is negligible. Therefore we can







3.4 Application Specific Design of WG
To design a WG keystream generator parameters m and l can be chosen according to
the target application. Table 3.1 shows various possible WG keystream generators.
Note that n is the size of the internal state (or LFSR) in bits, LCWGK is the linear
complexity of the generator and CAA is the complexity of the algebraic attack on
the generator. A ’Y’ in the column ONB indicates that optimal normal basis exist
for the corresponding m and a ’N’ indicates that it does not exist. All the designs
in Table 3.1 allow a secret key size of at least 80 bits. The linear complexity
of the generator can be selected according to the application requirements. For
example if the generator is to be used for encryption and decryption of packet
based data a very large linear complexity of the keystream may not be required.
Consider the design with m = 16, l = 16 and secret key K of length 100 bits.
The linear complexity in this case is 232.5 and therefore the maximum amount of
keystream that can be generated with one pair of secret key K and an initial vector
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Table 3.1: WG keystream generators and their corresponding security levels
m l n LCWGK CAA ONB
11 16 176 224.7 281.7 Y
11 24 264 227.6 290 Y
11 32 352 229.6 295.8 Y
14 16 224 229.2 2101.1 Y
14 24 336 232.6 2111 Y
14 32 448 235 2118.1 Y
16 10 160 228.1 2105.3 N
16 16 256 232.5 2118.8 N
16 24 384 236.4 2130.4 N
11 32 512 239.3 2138.6 N
29 11 319 245 2182 Y
is approximately 232 (or 4 gigabits). Since the packet size in most packet based
communications applications is much smaller (a few bytes to a few kilobytes) and
the generator is re-initialized with a new initial vector for each packet, this linear
complexity is sufficiently high. Although ONB do not exist for m = 16, the WG
transformation can be implemented efficiently by using the subfield decomposition
of F216 [96]. A specific implementation of inversion in F216 is also given in [14]. Also
note that for packet based applications the re-initialization time of the generator is
very critical. We will show in the next section that WG keystream generators can
be re-initialized in only 2l steps. If an application requires a long keystream, then
a larger linear complexity can be obtained by increasing the size of l or m or both.
For example for m = 29 and l=11 the generator can easily handle a keystream of
length 245 bits.
3.5 WG-128 Keystream Generator
Now we give a concrete example of a 128-bit WG keystream generator: WG-128.
We derive all the parameters of the generator using the procedures given in the
previous section. We also show how to implement this generator and discuss its
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security. The WG-128 keystream generator is shown in Figure 3.1. The generator
allows for a 128-bit secret key and 128-bit initial vectors(IVs). It consists of an 11
stage linear feedback shift register(LFSR) over F229 . The feedback polynomial of
the LFSR is primitive over F229 and is given by
p(x) = x11 + x10 + x9 + x6 + x3 + x + γ (3.10)
where γ = β464730077 and β is a root of g(x):
g(x) = x29 + x28 + x24 + x21 + x20 + x19 + x18 + x17 +
x14 + x12 + x11 + x10 + x7 + x6 + x4 + x + 1. (3.11)
We define S(1), S(2), S(3), .., S(11) ∈ F229 to be the state of the LFSR and the
internal state of the WG keystream generator. We denote the output of the LFSR
as bi = S(11− i), i = 0, 1, .., 10. Then for i ≥ 11, we have
bi = bi−1 + bi−2 + bi−5 + bi−8 + bi−10 + γbi−11, i ≥ 11 (3.12)
The output of the LFSR is filtered by a nonlinear WG transformation, F229 → F2,
to produce the keystream. All the elements of F229 are represented in normal basis
and all the finite field computations are performed in normal basis as well.
For WG transformation, consider F229 generated by the primitive polynomial
g(x) with β as its root. Let




19+210−1, x ∈ F229 . (3.13)
We can rewrite t(x) as


































Figure 3.2: Implementation of WG transformation: F229 → F2
Then the WG transformation is given as
f(x) = Tr(t(x + 1) + 1), x ∈ F229 . (3.15)
Note that Tr(1) = 1, therefore we can rewrite f(x) as
f(x) = Tr(t(x + 1)) + 1, x ∈ F229 . (3.16)
3.5.1 Implementation of WG-128
We first state a few facts about computation in F229 when field elements are repre-
sented in normal basis.
• If the field elements are represented in a normal basis, squaring can be done
by right cyclic shift.
• If γ is the generator of the normal basis then 1 = ∑28i=0 γ2
i
, i.e., the 29 bit
vector representing 1 is all ones vector. Therefore addition of a field element,
in normal basis representation, with 1 can be done by simply inverting the
bits of that element.
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• The trace of all the basis elements is one, i.e., Tr(γ2i) = 1 where 0 ≤ i ≤ 28.
Therefore the trace of any field element represented as a 29 bit vector can be
obtained by adding all the bits of the elements over F2 (i.e., XOR).
To facilitate the implementation of the WG transformation we provide a more
specific description in Figure 3.2. Note that Figure 3.2 comes directly from Eqns.
(3.14), (3.16), and the facts stated above. From the figure the output of the WG
transformation can be written as
output = ¤
⊕
((q1 ⊕ (q2 ⊕ (q3 ⊕ (q4 ⊕ I))))) (3.17)
where
q1 = (I À 9)⊗ ((I À 19)⊗ I)
q2 = (I
210−1 À 9)⊗ I
q3 = I
210−1 ⊗ (I À 19)
q4 = (I À 10)⊗ I
I = ¤(input).
The notation x ⊗ y means normal basis multiplication of x and y in F229 defined
by g(x). Similarly (x)2
10−1 means raising x to the power 210 − 1 in F229 defined by
g(x). Note that this calculation requires 4 multiplications in F229 . x⊕ y represents
the bitwise addition (XOR) of words x and y, and x À c represents the cyclic shift
of x, c stages to the right where c is a positive integer. The symbol ¤(x) means all
the 29 bits of x are complemented and
⊕
(x) means the addition of the 29 bits of




i=0 xi mod 2.
3.5.2 Key Initialization and Re-synchronization
The state of the LFSR is represented as S(1), S(2), S(3), .., S(11) ∈ F229 ; Each stage
S(i) ∈ F229 , is represented as S1,..,29(i) where 1 ≤ i ≤ 11. Similarly we represent
the key bits as k1,..,j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 128 and IV bits as IV1,..,m, 1 ≤ m ≤ 128. The key
and the IV are loaded into the LFSR as follows:
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S1,..16(1) = k1,..,16 S17,..24(1) = IV1,..,8 S1,..8(2) = k17,..,24
S9,..24(2) = IV9,..,24 S1,..16(3) = k25,..,40 S17,..24(3) = IV25,..,32
S1,..8(4) = k41,..,48 S9,..24(4) = IV33,..,48 S1,..16(5) = k49,..,64
S17,..24(5) = IV49,..,56 S1,..8(6) = k65,..,72 S9,..24(6) = IV57,..,72
S1,..16(7) = k73,..,88 S17,..24(7) = IV73,..,80 S1,..8(8) = k89,..,96
S9,..24(8) = IV81,..,96 S1,..16(9) = k97,..,112 S17,..24(9) = IV97,..,104
S1,..8(10) = k113,..,120 S9,..24(10) = IV105,..,120 S1,..8(11) = k121,..,128
S17,..24(11) = IV121,..,128
All the remaining bits of the LFSR are set to zero. Once LFSR has been loaded
with the key and IV , the keystream generator is run for 22 clock cycles. This is
the key initialization phase of the cipher operation. During this phase the 29 bit
vector, given by
keyinitvec = ((q1 ⊕ (q2 ⊕ (q3 ⊕ (q4 ⊕ I))))) (3.18)
in Figure 3.2, is added to the feedback of the LFSR which is then used to update the
LFSR. The key initialization process is shown in Figure 3.3. Once the key has been
initialized the LFSR is clocked once and the 1 bit output of the WG transformation
gives the first bit of the running keystream. The linear complexity of the keystream
is slightly more than 245 (from Eqn. (3.9)), and therefore the maximum length of
the keystream allowed to be generated with a single key and IV is 245. After this
the cipher must be reinitialized with a new IV or a new key or both.
3.5.3 Security of WG-128
The keystream generated by the WG keystream generator is balanced, has period
2319 − 1, and has ideal two-level autocorrelation. The linear complexity of the
keystream is approximately 245.0415 and it has ideal t-tuple distribution where 1 ≤
t ≤ 11. The Boolean function that corresponds to F229 → F2 WG transformation
has algebraic degree 11 and its nonlinearity is 228−214 = 268419072. The size of the
WG internal state is 319 bits which is more than twice the largest possible key size,


































Figure 3.3: Key initialization phase of WG cipher
of the algebraic attacks as explained in Section 3.3.6 is approximately 2182 which is
much higher than the largest possible key space.
To analyze the resistance of WG stream cipher against correlation attacks we
have to consider the nonlinearity and resiliency of the WG transformation. The
WG transformation in WG-128 is 1-order resilient, i.e., the output of the WG
transformation or the keystream is not correlated to any single input bit of the
LFSR output.This suggests that WG cipher is secure against correlation attacks.
However we must consider more sophisticated correlation attacks in which WG
transformation is approximated by linear functions. These linear approximations
can then be used to derive a generator matrix of a linear code and its decoding can
be performed by a Maximum Likelihood (ML) decoding algorithm to recover the
internal state of LFSR. The exact details of the attack are beyond the scope of this
thesis and the reader is referred to [19] for more details. We will only use theoretical
bounds derived in [19] to make sure that our cipher is secure against these attacks.
Let f ′ be the Boolean function representation of WG transformation and l be a
linear function with minimum Hamming distance to f ′. Then the probability that
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they produce the same output for a given input x is given by
P (f ′(x) = l(x)) =
229 − (228 − 214)
229
= 0.5000305. (3.19)
Using the results given in [19] the amount of keystream required for a successful
attack is given by
N ≈ (k · 12 · ln2)1/3 · ε−2 · 2 319−k3 (3.20)
and decoding complexity is given by
Cdec = 2
k · k · 2ln2
(2ε)6
, (3.21)
where ε = P (f ′(x) = l(x))−0.5 = 0.0000305 and k is the number of LFSR internal
state bits recovered. If we choose k to be very small, i.e., k = 5, the amount of
keystream required for the attack is approximately 2133, which is not a realistic
amount to collect. Moreover the complexity of pre-computation phase is more than
2266. Since the maximum keystream that can be produced with a single key and
IV is 245 we choose k = 274 to reduce N to this number. Now the complexity of
the decoding phase is approximately 2366. This analysis shows that the WG cipher
is secure against this kind of correlation attacks.
3.5.4 Hardware Implementation of WG-128
The normal basis multiplication in F229 is the most expensive operation in the hard-
ware implementation of WG-128. Depending on the type and number of multipliers
used, a wide variety of area versus speed tradeoffs are possible. An implementation
can range from using a single serial normal basis multiplier to multiple parallel
normal basis multipliers. While the underlying platform and speed requirements
will dictate an implementation, we suggest a straightforward implementation which
can achieve high speed with relatively less amount of hardware. A parallel normal
basis multiplier multiplies two elements in normal basis and produces the result in
one clock cycle. Therefore we suggest using 2 parallel normal basis multipliers. In
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Figure 3.2, there are nine multiplications in the WG transformation and one in the
feedback of the LFSR. Therefore a keystream bit can be produced every 5th clock
cycle. Note that the cyclic shifts can be done by rearranging the connections to the
registers or the inputs of multipliers.
Several normal basis multipliers have been proposed in the literature [71, 113,
111, 102, 1, 103, 104]. As stated earlier the hardware complexity of a normal basis
multiplier depends on the basis used to represent the field elements. More precisely
it depends on the multiplication matrix CN of the chosen normal basis [79]. The
complexity is directly proportional to the number of ones in the CN matrix. To
facilitate the hardware implementation of a normal basis multiplier for WG trans-
formation we provide the CN matrix that corresponds to the chosen optimal normal
basis of F229 in Appendix A. The optimal normal basis multiplier given in [111] can
be implemented with 841 AND gates and 1218 XOR gates only. Note that this
is the best multiplier known to us presently. Any improvement in the efficiency
of normal basis finite field multiplier can increase the efficiency of the hardware
implementation of the WG keystream generator further.
3.5.5 Software Implementation
The software implementation of the WG cipher is straightforward. Since the ele-
ments of F229 can be represented within a single word of a 32 bit processor, each of
the addition, negation and shift operations can be performed by a single instruction.
The time consuming operations in software are the normal basis multiplications.
The exact implementation of the multiplier depends on the multiplication matrix.
Several algorithms exist for performing normal basis multiplication in software effi-
ciently [92,105]. We provide C implementations of the normal basis multiplication
and inversion [41] algorithms for the optimal normal basis over F229 in Appendix
A. The implementations are provided as examples and we do not claim them to be
the most efficient. Any normal basis multiplication and inversion algorithm can be
used for the software implementation of the cipher.
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3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we presented a family of keystream generators with ideal two-level
autocorrelation and other guaranteed randomness properties. We showed how WG
keystream generators can be designed to fulfil various application requirements.
Finally we presented WG-128 as a concrete example from the WG family and





In Chapter 3 we proposed a stream cipher suitable for hardware applications. In
this chapter we propose a new and efficient stream cipher suitable for software
applications. The cipher is similar in design to the famous and widely used RC4
stream cipher and is therefore named RC4-like keystream generator. The proposed
generator produces 32 or 64 bits in each iteration and can be implemented with
reasonable memory requirements. It has a huge internal state and offers higher
resistance to state recovery attacks than the original 8-bit RC4. Further, on a 32-
bit processor the generator is 3.1 times faster than original RC4. We also show
that it can resist attacks that are successful on the original RC4. The generator is
suitable for high speed software encryption.
4.1 Background
RC4 was designed by Ron Rivest in 1987 and kept as a trade secret until it leaked
out in 1994. Unlike many stream ciphers that are based on LFSRs, the design of
RC4 is based on exchange-shuffle paradigm [66]. The design consists of a large
table/array that slowly changes with time under its own control. The popularity of
the design is due to its simplicity and ease of implementation. For the generators
based on such designs it is hard to theoretically establish the randomness properties
of the keystream [47]. RC4 consists of a table of all the N = 2n possible n-bit
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words and two n-bit pointers. In original RC4 n is 8, and thus it has a huge state
of log2(2
8!× (28)2) ≈ 1700 bits. It is thus impossible to guess even a small part of
this state and almost all the techniques developed to attack stream ciphers based
on linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) fail on RC4. Although state recovery
attacks against RC4 have not been successful, several distinguishing attacks have
been found on RC4. A few attempts have also been made to improve the design of
RC4 against these attacks. Two significant ones are VMPC [118] and RC4A [98].
Both VMPC and RC4A have designs similar to RC4 and were shown to suffer
from similar distinguishing attacks [112]. Recently some stream ciphers have been
proposed that consist of a large internal state that changes under its own control
just like RC4. However the state update functions in these ciphers are more complex
and are designed to achieve a rapid change in state with time. Three ciphers that
fall in this category are HC-256 [115], Py [9], and MV3 [60].
When RC4 was developed most commercially available processors were either
8-bit or 16-bit. Using the word size n = 8 was suitable for these processors and the
amount of memory required to store the RC4 table was also feasible. Today the
processors have word lengths of 32 bits or 64 bits but the most common mode for
RC4 still uses n = 8. The reason is that for RC4 with n = 32 or n = 64, the size of
the memory required to store the table and the key initialization time are too high.
Still, since the modern processors have large word sizes it is of interest to design an
RC4-like stream cipher that can take advantage of a large word size.
We begin our design by modifying original RC4 algorithm so that it can exploit
the 32-bit and 64-bit processor architectures without increasing the size of the table
significantly. We call the proposed algorithm RC4(n,m), where n and m are defined
in Section 4.3. The algorithm is general enough to incorporate different word as
well as table sizes. For example with 32-bit word size a table of 256 words can be
used. We try to keep the original structure of RC4 as much as possible, however the
proposed changes affect some underlying design principles on which the security of
RC4 is based. Therefore we analyze the security of the modified RC4 and compare
it to the original RC4. We show that RC4(n,m) is faster than RC4 and is also
secure against several attacks that are successful on RC4.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we give a brief
description of original RC4. In Section 4.3 we propose a modified RC4 keystream
generator. The security of the proposed generator is analyzed in Section 4.4 followed
by a performance analysis in Section 4.5. Finally we present the known attacks on
our proposed generator in Section 4.6 and possible countermeasures in Section 4.7.
4.2 Original RC4
In this section we give a description of the original RC4. We also give a brief
description of previous attacks on RC4.
4.2.1 Description of RC4
The RC4 algorithm consists of two parts: The key scheduling algorithm (KSA)
and the pseudo-random generation algorithm (PRGA). The algorithms are shown
in Figure 4.1 where l is the length of the secret key in bytes, and N is the size of
the array S or the S-box in words. A common keysize in RC4 is between 5 and
32 bytes. In most applications RC4 is used with a word size n = 8 and array size
N = 28. In the first phase of RC4 operation an identity permutation (0, 1, ..., N−1)
is loaded in the array S. A secret key K is then used to initialize S to a random
permutation by shuffling the words in S. During the second phase of the operation,
the PRGA produces random words from the permutation in S. Each iteration of
the PRGA loop produces one output word which constitutes the running keystream.
The keystream is bit-wise XORed with the plaintext to obtain the ciphertext. All
the operations described in Figure 4.1 are byte operations (n = 8). Most modern
processors however operate on 32-bit or 64-bit words. If the word size in RC4 is
increased to n = 32 or n = 64, to increase its performance, the size of array S
becomes 232 or 264 bytes which is not practical. Note that these are the array sizes
to store all the 32-bit or 64-bit permutations respectively.
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KSA(K, S)
for i = 0 to N – 1
S[i] = i;
j = 0;
for i = 0 to N – 1






i = (i + 1) mod N;
j = (j + S[i]) mod N;
Swap(S[i],S[j]);
out = S[(S[i] + S[j]) mod N];
Figure 4.1: The KSA and PRGA in RC4.
4.2.2 Previous analysis of RC4
Cryptanalysis of RC4 attracted a lot of attention in the cryptographic community
after it was made public in 1994. Numerous significant weaknesses were discovered,
including Finney’s forbidden states [42], classes of weak keys [107], patterns that
appear with twice the expected probability (the second byte bias) [69], partial
message recovery [69], full key recovery attacks [44], analysis of biased distribution
of RC4 initial permutation [77], and predicting and distinguishing attacks [68].
Knudsen et al. have attacked versions of RC4 with n < 8 by their backtracking
algorithm [64]. The most serious weakness in RC4 was observed by Fluhrer et al.
in [44] where RC4 was proved to have a practical attack in the security protocol
WEP.
Two variants of RC4 have recently been proposed: RC4A [98] and VMPC [118].
RC4A works with two RC4 arrays and its keystream generation stage is slightly
more efficient than RC4’s, but the initialization stage requires twice the effort of
RC4’s. VMPC has several changes to the KSA, the IV integration, the round opera-
tion and the output selection. Note that RC4A and VMPC use n = 8 as parameter.
Maximov described in [74] a linear distinguisher for both the variants, requiring 258
data for RC4A and requiring 254 data for VMPC. Tsunoo et al. described in [112]
a distinguisher for RC4A and VMPC keystream generators, requiring 224 and 223
keystream prefixes respectively. For further weaknesses of RC4, and most of the
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known attacks on it see [48,42,58,47,45,78,56,107,64,69,44,110,101,77,97,98,68,
8, 74, 112,70].
4.3 Proposed Modification to RC4
We now propose a modification to the original RC4 algorithm which enables us
to release 32 bits or 64 bits in each iteration of the PRGA loop. This is done by
increasing the word size to 32 or 64 while keeping the array size S much smaller
than 232 or 264. We will denote the new algorithm as RC4(n,m) where N = 2n is
the size of the array S in words, m is the word size in bits, n ≤ m and M = 2m.
For example RC4(8, 32) means that the size of the array S is 256 and each element
of S holds 32-bit words.
4.3.1 Pseudo-Random Generation Algorithm
If we choose n to be much smaller than m (m = 32 or 64) in RC4(n,m), then
this results in reasonable memory requirements for the array S. However now the
contents of the array S do not constitute a complete permutation of 32-bit or 64-
bit words. In RC4, a swap operation is used to update the state between outputs.
Using a swap to update the state in RC4(n,m) will not change the elements in
the array. Instead, to update the state we add an integer addition modulo 232 (264
for n = 64). This way of updating the state is the first difference between RC4
and RC4(n, m). Since the state will be updated by replacing a random element by
another random m-bit number, the swap operation is not needed. The index value
that is updated is the value used for computing the output value. Updating the
array with new values is important since the array is not a permutation and the
size of the array is only a small fraction of all the possible numbers in ZM .
The second main difference between original RC4 and this variant is the usage
of a third variable, k , in addition to i and j . This m-bit variable is used for two
reasons. First, to mask the output so that it does not simply represent a value
stored in the array. Second, to ensure that the new value in the update step does
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KSA(K, S)
for i = 0 to N – 1
S[i] = ai;
j = k = 0;
Repeat r times
for i = 0 to N – 1
j = (j + S[i] + K[i mod l]) mod N;
Swap(S[i],S[j]);
S[i] = S[i] + S[j] mod M;





i = (i + 1) mod N;
j = (j + S[i]) mod N;
k = (k + S[j]) mod M;
out = (S[(S[i] + S[j]) mod N] + k) mod M;
S[(S[i] + S[j]) mod N] = k + S[i] mod M;
Figure 4.2: The modified KSA and PRGA for RC4(n, m).
not depend on just one or a few values in the array. The variable k is initialized in
the KSA and is key dependent.
4.3.2 Key Scheduling Algorithm
The key scheduling algorithm (KSA) in RC4 is used to permute the elements in the
array in a key dependent way. Each element is swapped with a random element. In
this variant of RC4 the elements will not be a permutation of a small set so a similar
modification is made to the KSA as to the PRGA. In order to achieve a high degree
of randomness in the key scheduling we keep the swap operation in the KSA. In
addition to the swap operation each word is updated through an integer addition.
We give some initial values, ai, for RC4(8, 32), in Appendix B. The modified KSA
and PRGA are given in Figure 4.2 where N = 2n, M = 2m, K is a vector of bytes
and l is the length of the key K in bytes. RC4(n,m) can use the same flexible span
of keysizes as RC4. The value of r in the KSA is motivated below and for a random
array with 256 32-bit numbers the value of r is 20.
We take the example of 256, 32-bit numbers to motivate the number of steps
used in the KSA. The array is initiated with 256 fixed 32-bit numbers and after
the key scheduling algorithm the goal is that without knowing any bits of the
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key an attacker can not guess the number in any array position with probability
significantly greater than 2−32. Since the array only contains a small fraction of all
32-bit numbers, the entries need to be updated. We update as the sum of the two
swapped entries. After running through the array once, the probability that value





so a known value will be in the array with probability ≈ 0.37. The probability
that this value is not updated after r rounds is 0.37r. For a random array with 256
32-bit numbers the probability that a specific number is in the array is
1− (1− 2−32)256 ≈ 2−24
since a value can be present more than once in our case. We run the key initialization
a sufficient number of rounds so that any initial value remains unupdated with





= 2−24 ⇒ r ≈ 16.6.
For the case RC4(8, 32) we will take the value of r to be 20. Similarly the value
of r can be calculated for different array sizes and different numbers of bits. In
Table 4.1 we list the minimum number of rounds needed in the key scheduling such
that no number has significantly higher probability of being in the array than any
other number. We suggest to always use 20 rounds in the 32-bit version and always
40 rounds in the 64-bit version, when the array size is between 28 and 212.
4.4 Security Analysis of RC4(n,m)
In this section we analyze the security of RC4(n,m). We show that RC4(n, m) re-
sists all known significant attacks on RC4. We consider the resistance of the gener-
ator against state recovery attacks and the randomness properties of the keystream.
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Mode r Mode r
RC4(8, 32) 16.6 RC4(8, 64) 38.7
RC4(9, 32) 15.9 RC4(9, 64) 38.1
RC4(10, 32) 15.2 RC4(10, 64) 37.4
RC4(11, 32) 14.6 RC4(11, 64) 36.7
RC4(12, 32) 13.9 RC4(12, 64) 36.1
Table 4.1: The minimum number of rounds in the key scheduling.
4.4.1 Statistical Tests on the Keystream
The keystream generated by the RC4(8, 32) stream cipher was tested with NIST’s
statistical tests [93]. No bias was found by any of the 16 tests from the NIST suite.
We tested 235 output bits from the generator.
4.4.2 Security of the Key Scheduling Algorithm
We choose the number of steps in the key scheduling algorithm such that the
probability that a specific number is not updated is smaller than the probability
that this number is present in a random array of size N with m-bit numbers. This
ensures that an attacker can not guess an array entry with probability significantly
higher than N/2m when key generation starts. However, even if r is small it is
unclear if an attacker can use the information about the values in the array in
an actual attack. This is because the first output is the sum of 20 · 256 + 2 for
RC4(n, 32) and 40 · 256+2 for RC4(n, 64) previous and current values in the array.
4.4.3 Internal State of RC4(n,m)
Like the original RC4, the security of RC4(n,m) comes from its huge internal state.
The size of the internal state of original RC4 is approximately 1700 bits. In case
of RC4(n,m) the internal state does not consist of a permutation and it may have
repetitions of words. The number of ways of putting 2m elements into N cells where
repetitions are allowed is (2m)N . Note, in RC4(n,m) we are using an m-bit variable
56
k, which can be thought of as another cell. Therefore the size of the internal state is
simply given by N2×(2m)N+1. For example for RC4(8, 32) this number is 8240 bits
which is much larger than original RC4. Recovering the internal state of RC4(n,m)
is therefore much harder than recovering the internal state of RC4.
4.4.4 Resistance to IV Weakness
Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir showed in [44] a key recovery attack on RC4 if several
IVs were known. The attack will work if the IV precedes or follows the key. In [70],
Mantin showed that XORing the IV and the key also allows for a key recovery
attack in the chosen IV model. The attack in which the IV precedes the key relies
on the fact that the state at some point is in a resolved condition, which means that
with probability 0.05, we can predict the output and also recover one byte of the
key. Repeating the attack recovers another byte of the key etc. In RC4(n,m) this
attack will not be possible. In the resolved condition the value i must be such that
if X = Si[1] and Y = Si[X], then i ≥ 1, i ≥ X and i ≥ X + Y , where Si[V ] is the
entry S[V ] at time i. Moreover, Si[1], Si[X] and Si[X + Y ] must be known to the
attacker. Since the array is updated 20 times for RC4(8, 32) and the key is used
in all iterations, an attacker will not know the state after one iteration. Hence,
the attacker can not know the state at a time when i > 1 in the last iteration
which would be necessary for the attack to work. With similar arguments, we can
conclude that the IV weakness in RC4 cannot be used for RC4(n,m) when the IV
follows or is XORed with the key.
Concatenating the IV and the secret key does not seem to introduce an ex-
ploitable weakness to the cipher. However, we still consider it better to use a hash
function on the secret key and IV and then use the hash value as session key. Then
no related keys will be used if the IV is e.g., a counter. This is the mode used in
SSL.
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4.4.5 Resistance to Mantin’s Distinguishing Attack
In [69] Mantin and Shamir discovered that the second output byte of RC4 is ex-
tremely biased, i.e., it takes the value of zero with probability 2/N instead of 1/N .
This is due to the fact that if S0[2] = 0 and S0[1] 6= 2, the second output byte of
the keystream is zero with probability one. In RC4(n,m) the output is given by
out = (S[(S[i] + S[j]) mod N ] + k) mod M , where we assume that k is uniformly
distributed. Therefore if S0[2] = 0 and S0[1] 6= 2 in RC4(n,m), the output word will
still be uniformly distributed due to k. Therefore Mantin’s distinguishing attack
does not apply to RC4(n,m).
4.4.6 Resistance to Paul and Preneel’s Attack
In [97] Paul and Preneel discovered a bias in the first two output bytes of the RC4
keystream. They observed that if S0[1] = 2, then the first two output bytes of RC4
are always different. Therefore the probability that the first two output bytes are
equal is (1 – 1/N)/N which leads to a distinguishing attack. In RC4(n,m) however
due to the uniform distribution of k, the above state does not affect the distribution
of the first two output bytes. Therefore this attack does not apply to RC4(n,m).
4.4.7 Probability of Weak States
RC4 has a number of weak states, called Finney states [42]. These states have very
short cycles, of length only 65280. The cipher is in a Finney state if j = i + 1 and
S[j] = 1. In this case the swap will be made between S[i] and S[i + 1] and both
i and j are incremented by 1. Since the RC4 next state function is an invertible
mapping and the starting state is not a Finney state, RC4 will never enter any of
these weak states. It is easy to see that RC4(n,m) also has weak states. When all
entries are even and k is even, then all outputs as well as all future entries will be
even, resulting in a biased keystream. The state update function in RC4(n,m) is
not an invertible mapping so it will always be possible to enter one of these weak
states. However the probability that all state entries, as well as k are even is very
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low, 2−257. From this we can conclude that these weak states are of no concern to
the security of the cipher.
4.4.8 Forward Secrecy in RC4(n,m)
Like most of the keystream generators, RC4(n,m) keystream generator can also
be represented as a finite state machine. Suppose N = 2n, M = 2m and R =
Z2N×ZN+1M . The next state function is f : R → R. Let (i, j, k, x0, x1, · · · , xN−1) ∈ R
be any state, and (e, d, p, y0, y1, · · · , yN−1) ∈ R be the next state of the function
f . Then we have e = i + 1 mod N , d = j + xe mod N , p = k + xd, v = xe +
xd mod M , yv mod N = k + xe and yt = xt, ∀t 6= v mod N . Output of the cipher
is xv mod N + p. As seen above we can deterministically write down the value of
each parameter of the next state. So given a state (e, d, p, y0, y1, · · · , yN−1), we can
recover (i, j, k, x0, x1, · · · , xN−1) except xv because xv has been replaced. Therefore,
without the knowledge of xv the state function is non invertible.
4.4.9 Cycle Property
In original RC4 the state function is invertible. Non invertible state functions are
known to cause a significantly shorter average cycle length. If the size of the internal
state is s and the next state function is randomly chosen then the average cycle
length is about 2
s
2 . For a randomly chosen invertible next state function the average
cycle length is 2s−1, (see [43]). As s in RC4(8, 32) is huge (i.e., 8240) the reduction
in cycle length is not a problem.
4.4.10 Randomness of the Keystream
To analyze the keystream of RC4(n,m) we first state the security principles under-
lying the design of original RC4. The KSA intends to turn an identity permutation
S into a pseudorandom permutation of elements and PRGA generates one output
byte from a pseudorandom location of S in every round. At every round the secret
internal state S is changed by the swapping of elements, one in a known location
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and another pointed to by a random index. Therefore we can say that the security
of original RC4 depends on the following three factors.
• Uniform distribution of the initial permutation of elements in S.
• Uniform distribution of the value of index pointer j.
• Uniform distribution of the index pointer from which the output is taken
(i.e., (S[i] + S[j]) mod N).
The above three conditions are necessary but not sufficient. The KSA uses a
secret key to provide a uniformly distributed initial permutation of the elements
in S. The value of the index pointer j is updated by the statement j = (j + S[i])
mod N . Since the elements in S are uniformly distributed the value of j is also
uniformly distributed. By the same argument (S[i]+S[j]) mod N is also uniformly
distributed. Note that the internal state of RC4 consists of the contents of array
S and the index pointer j. The state update function consists of an update of the
value of j and the update of the permutation in S through a swap operation given
by the statement Swap(S[i], S[j]). Since j is updated in a uniformly distributed
way, the selection of the locations to be swapped is also uniformly distributed. This
ensures that the internal state of RC4 evolves in a uniformly distributed way.
We now consider RC4(n,m). The first difference from original RC4 is that
whereas the array S in original RC4 is a permutation of all the 256 elements in Z28 ,
the array S in RC4(n,m) only contains 2n m-bit words out of 2m possible words in
Z2m . Consider the PRGA and assume that the initial permutation of 2n elements
in S is uniformly distributed over Z2m . Then the index pointer j is updated by the
statement
j = j + S[i] mod N
where j ∈ Z2n and S[i] ∈ Z2m . If the value of S[i] is uniformly distributed over Z2m ,
the value of index pointer j is also uniformly distributed over Z2n . This implies
that the value of the index pointer from which the output is taken (i.e., S[i] + S[j]
mod N) is uniformly distributed over Z2n . For the above properties to hold during
PRGA phase it is essential that the internal state of the RC4(n,m) evolves in a
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uniformly distributed manner. Recall that in original RC4 the uniform distribution
of pointer j was the reason for the state to evolve uniformly since all the 256
elements in Z28 were present in the state. However in RC4(n,m) this is not the
case and the uniform distribution of j over Z2n is not sufficient. The state update
function also consists of the update of an element in S by integer addition modulo
M given by the statement
S[S[i] + S[j] mod N ] = k + S[i] mod M.
Since both k and S[i] are uniformly distributed, the updated element in the state
is also uniformly distributed. The internal state of RC4(n,m) evolves in a uni-
formly distributed manner and therefore the output of the cipher is also uniformly
distributed, i.e., all the elements from Z2m occur with equal probability.
4.5 Performance of RC4(n,m)
RC4(n, 32) has been designed to exploit the 32-bit architecture of the current pro-
cessors. If n is chosen such that the corresponding memory requirements are reason-
able, RC4(n, 32) can give higher throughput than the original 8-bit RC4. We now
compare the performance of RC4(8, 32) with 8-bit RC4 and several other stream ci-
phers with similar designs. According to the NESSIE Performance Document [90],
RC4 throughput is about 1.1 bits/cycle on a Pentium III processor. The throughput
of eSTREAM submissions Py and HC-256, as reported by their designers, are 2.8
bits/cycle on a Pentium III and 1.9 bits/cycle on a Pentium 4 respectively. MV3 is
the most recent design and its reported throughput is 1.67 bits/cycle on a Pentium
IV. RC4(8, 32) however achieves a throughput of approximately 3.4 bits/cycle on
a Pentium IV. Therefore it is approximately 3.1 times faster than RC4 on 32-bit
machines. It is also considerably faster than HC-256, Py and MV3 primarily due
to its simple structure. We also implemented RC4(8, 64) on a 64-bit Ultrasparc IV
and found it to be approximately 6 times faster than the 8-bit RC4. This speedup
is significant when large files are encrypted.
Though the keystream generation is faster than original RC4, the key scheduling
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algorithm is slower. This is due to the importance of sufficient randomness in the
initial state when keystream generation starts. In a situation where many small
packets are encrypted with different keys/IVs, RC4 might still be faster due to its
faster KSA.
4.6 Attack on RC4(n,m)
In Asiacrypt 2006 Paul and Preneel [100] presented a distinguishing attack on
RC4(8, 32). In their paper they referred to RC4(8,32) as GGNH. The attack con-
centrates only on the least significant bytes of the words in the table S. Let St[it]
denote eight least significant bits of the 32-bit word at location i in table S at
time t and let zt(l) denote the l-th bit in the 32-bit keystream word produced at
time t. If St[it] = St+1[jt+1] and St[jt] = St+1[it+1] then zt+1(0) = 0. It is easy
to see that if the above is true then we can write zt+1 = 2(k + St[it]) mod 2
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which implies zt+1(0) = 0. We denote this event by E. Since our table size is 2
8
and we consider the table entries to be uniformly distributed, P [E] = 2−16 and
P [zt+1(0) = 0] = 1/2(1 + 2
−16) which is greater than 0.5. Therefore by observing
the least significant bytes of the keystream words, the authors of [100] were able
to construct a distinguisher which has data and time complexity of O(232.89).
4.7 Countermeasures and Future Work
The above distinguishing attack shows that while the operations in RC4(n,m) are
mostly designed to break linearity over Z2, more operations are required to break
the linearity over Z232 and Z28 . This can be achieved through efficient bit-wise
operations available on all modern processors. A good target for these operations is
the update of the value k. The updated value of k must have a complex relation with
its previous value. This can be obtained by adding one or more bitwise operations
besides the addition modulo 232. Since k is used both in updating the table and
also computing the keystream word z, this should provide extra security against
the type of distinguishing attacks presented above. However the modified algorithm
62
has to be thoroughly analyzed for security. We intend to incorporate these changes
into our design in future and propose a newer version of the RC4-like keystream
generator.
It must be noted that the bitwise operations are very fast and the addition of two
or three bitwise operations will not affect the performance of the RC4(n,m). We
still expect it to be approximately 3 times faster than RC4 on 32-bit platforms. Note
that RC4, HC-256, and MV3 have throughputs which are less than 2 bits/cycle.
Although Py has a throughput of 2.8 bits/cycle, it was shown to be vulnerable to a
distinguishing attack [99]. To address the weakness, the designers of Py proposed
a new version of the cipher PyPy [10] with a reduced throughput of 1.4 bits/cycle
which again turned out to be vulnerable to another distinguishing attack [100].
Therefore we believe that with current designs being slower than 2 bits/cycle there
is considerable room for strengthening RC4(8, 32) by adding more operations to its
update function. Another area of improvement is the key scheduling of RC4(n, m).
It is much slower than that of RC4 since the entries of the array must be sufficiently
random before keystream generation starts. An improvement of the KSA would




Algebraic Immunity of Boolean
Functions
We now turn our focus from the design of stream ciphers to the cryptographic
properties of nonlinear transformations used in these ciphers. In this chapter we
analyze the algebraic immunity of Boolean functions used in stream ciphers. In the
next two chapters we will analyze the algebraic immunity and other cryptographic
properties of the S-boxes used in block ciphers. We discussed the role of nonlin-
ear transformations in the design of symmetric ciphers in Chapter 1. Many LFSR
based stream ciphers use nonlinear Boolean functions to destroy the linearity of
the LFSR(s) output. Many of these designs have been broken by algebraic attacks.
Therefore from a designer’s point of view it is very important to understand the
algebraic properties of the nonlinear Boolean functions that make these designs
vulnerable to algebraic attacks. In this chapter we analyze a popular and crypto-
graphically significant class of nonlinear Boolean functions for their resistance to
algebraic attacks. We develop techniques to compute the algebraic immunity of
Boolean functions based on Power mappings and give meaningful bounds on the
algebraic immunity of functions based on Inverse, Kasami, Niho and Dobbertin ex-
ponents. The techniques developed in this chapter also give insight into the relation
between the polynomial form of Boolean functions and their algebraic immunity.
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5.1 Background
The idea behind the algebraic attacks is to express the cipher as a system of multi-
variate equations whose solution gives the secret key. The complexity of the attack
depends heavily on the degree of these equations. For complete details of an al-
gebraic attack on an LFSR based stream cipher refer to Section 1.6. We begin by
looking at a brief history of these attacks. The algebraic attacks on stream ciphers
composed of LFSR(s) and a nonlinear combining function f were first proposed
by Courtois and Meier in [23, 24]. The authors presented several scenarios under
which low degree equations exist for ciphers using a combining function f with
small number of inputs. These low degree equations are obtained by producing
low degree multiples of f , i.e., by multiplying f with a low degree function g such
that fg is of low degree. In [75] Meier, Pasalic and Carlet reduced the scenarios
(given in [23, 24]) under which low degree equations can exist to two and showed
that existence of low degree equations is equivalent to the existence of low degree
annihilators of f or f + 1.
Krause and Armknecht extended algebraic attacks to combiners with memory
in [3]. They proved that algebraic equations always exist for such combiners and
also gave an upper bound on the degree of such equations in terms of their input
size and memory. In [21] Courtois further extended these attacks to combiners
with memory and several outputs and provided an upper bound on the degree of
equations for such combiners in terms of the size of their input, output and memory.
An improvement on the algebraic attacks called fast algebraic attacks was presented
in [20]. These attacks have been further examined in [4, 57]. The first algebraic
attack on a block cipher was discussed in [108]. In [25] Courtois and Pieprzyk
showed that AES can be attacked by solving a system of quadratic equations. This
is possible because the only nonlinear component in AES, i.e., the S-box, can be
expressed as a system of quadratic Boolean equations.
Since the existence of low degree equations for simple combiners, combiners
with memory, and even S-boxes is important for algebraic attacks, Armknecht
combined the three cases in [5]. He showed that finding low degree equations for
simple combiners, combiners with memory, and S-boxes can be reduced to the same
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problem of finding low degree annihilators.
In other direction there is increasing interest in the construction of Boolean
functions with highest algebraic immunity. Some constructions have been pro-
posed [28,15,29] that can achieve maximum possible algebraic immunity dn
2
e, where
n is the number of inputs to the function. But the constructed function lacks cer-
tain cryptographic properties making it unsuitable to be used in a cryptosystem.
In the absence of a suitable construction the other option is to pick a function and
test it for low degree equations. However all current techniques for finding the low
degree equations are based on exhaustive search algorithms which are impractical
for larger values of n.
Most algorithms for finding the low degree equations are based on the theory
of Boolean functions. Even, polynomial functions and S-boxes, i.e., functions and
S-boxes designed over finite field F2n , n > 2, are analyzed according to this theory.
For example the filter function f : F216 → F2 used in the stream cipher SFINKS [14]
is a component of the inverse mapping in F216 . S-box used in AES [26] and stream
cipher SNOW [38] consists of inverse mapping in F28 . A power mapping from
F2n to F2n can be decomposed into n component functions, from F2n to F2, called
monomial trace functions.
In this chapter we use the theory of polynomial functions to analyze the algebraic
immunity of monomial trace function. This approach allows us to obtain meaningful
results that are very difficult to obtain from the theory of Boolean functions. For
example we derive upper bounds on the algebraic immunity of many monomial
trace functions that are much lower than the optimal upper bound presented in
the literature. We show that algebraic immunity of functions based on inverse,
Kasami, Niho and Dobbertin exponents [34] decreases drastically as n increases.
Moreover the existing algorithms to determine the algebraic immunity (and finding
low degree equations) of functions are very slow and are not practical for n > 25.
Our approach has no such limitation. The algebraic immunity of any monomial
trace function can be obtained directly from the formula regardless of the value
of n. Similarly the low degree equations required for the algebraic attack are also
obtained directly from the formula.
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5.2 Algebraic Immunity AI
A Boolean function f is said to admit an annihilating function g, if f ∗ g = 0.
In [75] AI of f , denoted by AI(f), is defined as the minimum value of d such
that f or f + 1 admits an annihilating function of degree d. Proposition 1 of [75]
states that existence of relations of the form f ∗ g = h, where g and h have degree
at most d, means the existence of annihilating function g′ of degree at most d (as
f 2 ∗ g + f ∗ h = f ∗ g + f ∗ h = f ∗ (g + h) = 0). Therefore if for f we can find a
function g such that degree of f ∗ g is d then we can say that AI(f) ≤ d.
Fact 1. [23, Theorem 6.0.1] Let f be any Boolean function with n inputs. Then
there is a Boolean function g 6= 0 of degree at most dn
2




Fact 1 shows that the upper bound on the AI of any Boolean function is dn
2
e.
To establish an upper bound on the AI of a polynomial function f we will try to
find multipliers g such that the degree of f ∗ g is less than dn
2
e.
5.3 Monomial Trace Functions and Power Map-
pings
Monomial trace functions are represented by a single trace term in polynomial form.
There are several compelling reasons to study the AI of monomial trace functions.
Any polynomial function can be expressed as a sum of monomial trace functions.
Therefore, for a constant multiplier g, theAI of any function f is upper bounded by
the maximum AI of any monomial trace function in its polynomial representation.
This bound may not always be tight but in certain cases it can reveal the weakness
of a function against algebraic attacks. Another important class of functions are
the functions that can be represented as monomial trace functions. These functions
can easily be constructed from a power mapping in a finite field. Therefore they can
be implemented efficiently and are good candidates for hardware oriented stream
ciphers. Power mappings can be represented as F : x → xa in F2n and are classified
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based on exponent a. These mappings can easily be decomposed into monomial
trace functions:
Let {α0, ..., αn−1} and {β0, ..., βn−1} be dual bases of F2n . Then an S-box based
on power mapping (F : x → xa) can be represented as F (x) = ∑n−1j=0 Trn1 (βjx2
it)αj,
x 6= 0 and its component functions can be represented as monomial trace functions
of the form fj(x) = Tr
n
1 (βjx
2it), where a ∈ Ct [52, page 56]. It is conventional to
represent monomial trace functions in the form Trn1 (βx
t) where t is a coset leader
of Ct. Note that we can write a = 2
−it for some i. So for any exponent a we can
write the monomial trace function in standard form as
f(x) = Trn1 (βx
a) = Trn1 (βx
2−it) = Trn1 (β
2ixt),
since Trn1 (x) = Tr
n
1 (x
2). Next we look at some important power mappings.
5.4 Some Well Known Power Mappings
The discussion in this section is based on [34]. Some well known power mappings
that have been studied for use in S-boxes are Inverse, Gold, Kasami, Welch and Niho
(see also [46, 59, 35]). These mappings are cryptographically significant because of
their high nonlinearity. Gold and Kasami power functions are maximally nonlinear
(their nonlinearity is 2n−1 − 2n−12 ) for odd n. Welch and Niho mappings are con-
jectured to be maximally nonlinear for odd n. For even n it is conjectured that for
all power mappings, maximum achievable nonlinearity is 2n−1 − 2n2 . If a mapping
achieves this nonlinearity it is called maximally nonlinear. For example inverse
mapping is maximally nonlinear for even n. Note that monomial trace functions
with the above mentioned exponents are simply the component functions of these
mappings. Therefore the nonlinearity of these monomial trace functions is greater
than or equal to the nonlinearity of their corresponding power mappings. More-
over, easy implementation and analysis of these monomial trace functions make
them suitable candidates for combining or filtering functions in stream ciphers [14].
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5.5 Algebraic Immunity of Monomial Trace Func-
tions
We provide the following proposition that will be used to derive upper bounds on
the AI of monomial trace functions.
Proposition 1 Let f(x) = Trn1 (βx
t) and g(x) = Trm1 (γx
r) be monomial trace
functions, where x ∈ F2n, t and r are the coset leaders of cosets Ct and Cr. The





Proof. Note both f(x) and g(x) are n variable Boolean functions. From the defini-




























where the algebraic degree of f(x)g(x) is given by the largest w such that γβ2
k 6= 0








Proposition 1 shows that we only need to add r to the members of coset Ct, and
the highest Hamming weight of the resulting integers gives the maximum possible
degree of f(x)g(x).
In the following theorem we derive an upper bound on the AI of monomial
trace functions based on a property of the exponent t, i.e., the number of runs of
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1’s in the binary representation of t.
Theorem 1 Let l = b√nc, k = n−bn
l
cl and f(x) = Trn1 (βxt), where β ∈ F2n and






l, k = 0;
n, 0 < k < l







il , k = 0





il+k , 0 < k < l
.
Then





where u is the number of runs of 1s in the binary representation of t.
To prove Theorem 1 we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1 r is a coset leader modulo 2n − 1.
Proof. The above can be established by examining the binary representation of r.






00 · · · 01
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01 . . . . . .
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01
2r = 00 · · · 10 00 · · · 10 . . . . . . 00 · · · 10 > r
· · ·
2l−1r = 10 · · · 00 10 · · · 00 . . . . . . 10 · · · 00 > r
2lr = 00 · · · 01 00 · · · 01 . . . . . . 00 · · · 01 = r
Therefore r is the coset leader modulo 2n − 1.
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00 · · · 01
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01 . . . . . .
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01





00 · · · 01
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01 . . . . . .
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01
︷ ︸︸ ︷





00 · · · 01
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01 . . . . . .
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01 = r
Therefore r is the coset leader modulo 2n − 1. 2
Note: For k = 0, |Cr| = l and for 0 < k < l, |Cr| = n, where |Cr| is the size of the
coset Cr.
In Lemma 1 ︷︸︸︷ is used to indicate the size of a segment in bits. From here
onwards we will use ︷︸︸︷ to represent the size of the segment as before and ︸︷︷︸ to
represent the number of 1’s in the segment.
Lemma 2 H(r + t2−i) ≤ ul + dn
l
e − 1, 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 and r, t, u, and l are as
defined in Theorem 1.
Proof. Consider the binary representations of r and t. In Lemma 1, r consists
of bn
l
c identical l bit segments when k = 0. If k 6= 0, then k least significant bits
of r form an additional segment. All dn
l
e segments have Hamming weight 1. We
can segment t in the same way as r however these segments may or may not be
identical. We will represent a segment of r and t as r′ and t′ respectively. Now
let us consider the addition of r′ and t′. Initially we will restrict ourselves to the
case where the binary representation of t′ has at most one run. Now consider all
possible transitions in t′ with and without carry.
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Case 1: 1 → 0 transition
j y j y ← carry
t′ =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
111 · · · 1 0 · · · 00 t′ =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
111 · · · 1 0 · · · 00
r′ = 000 · · · 00 · · · 01 r′ = 000 · · · 00 · · · 01
+ −−−−−−− + −−−−−−−
111 · · · 10 · · · 01 111 · · · 10 · · · 10
H(r′ + t′) = j + 1, j < l − 1 H(r′ + t′) = j + 1, j < l − 1
j y carry ← j y ← carry
t′ =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
111 · · · 11 0 t′ =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
111 · · · 11 0
r′ = 000 · · · 001 r′ = 000 · · · 001
+ −−−−−−− + −−−−−−−
111 · · · 111 000 · · · 000
H(r′ + t′) = j + 1, j = l − 1 H(r′ + t′) = 0, j = l − 1
Case 2: 0 → 1 transition
j y j y ← carry
t′ =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
000 · · · 0 1 · · · 11 t′ =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
000 · · · 0 1 · · · 11
r′ = 000 · · · 00 · · · 01 r′ = 000 · · · 00 · · · 01
+ −−−−−−− + −−−−−−−
000 · · · 10 · · · 00 000 · · · 10 · · · 01
H(r′ + t′) = 1, j < l H(r′ + t′) = 2, j < l
Case 3: No transition
← carry
t′ = 000 · · · 00 t′ = 000 · · · 00
r′ = 000 · · · 01 r′ = 000 · · · 01
+ −−−−− + −−−−−
000 · · · 01 000 · · · 10
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H(r′ + t′) = 1 H(r′ + t′) = 1
carry ← carry ← ← carry
t′ = 111 · · · 11 t′ = 111 · · · 11
r′ = 000 · · · 01 r′ = 000 · · · 01
+ −−−−− + −−−−−
000 · · · 00 000 · · · 01
H(r′ + t′) = 0 H(r′ + t′) = 1
From the above cases it is clear that H(r′ + t′) achieves maximum value l for
1 → 0 transition (no carry case). For 0 → 1 transition the maximum value is 2
and when there is no transition it is 1. Now consider the following complete binary
representation of r and t.
l l l
t =
︷ ︸︸ ︷∗ ∗ · · · ∗ ∗ . . . . . .
︷ ︸︸ ︷
1110 · · · 00 . . . . . . ︷ ︸︸ ︷∗ ∗ · · · ∗ ∗
r = 0 0 · · · 0 1 . . . . . . 0000 · · · 01 . . . . . . 0 0 · · · 0 1
where * can be either 1 or 0.
First we assume that each segment t′ has at most one run. To get the maximum
possible value of H(r + t2−i) each segment with a 1 → 0 transition must contribute
l number of 1’s to the sum. Since there are u number of 1 → 0 transitions this
adds up to ul number of 1’s. For u number of 1 → 0 transitions there are at most
u segments with 0 → 1 transitions, each contributing a maximum of 2 number of
1’s to the sum, i.e., 2u number of 1’s. All the remaining dn
l
e− 2u segments with no
transitions can contribute at most single 1 to the sum. So the total contribution
is ul + 2u + dn
l
e − 2u = ul + dn
l
e. Now consider the first segment from right to
left that contains a 0 → 1 transition (right most segment with a 0 → 1 transition).
For this segment to contribute 2 number of 1’s to the sum it must receive a carry,
otherwise it will contribute a single 1 (see case 2). Since the right most segment
never receives a carry, the only way a carry can be generated between the right
most segment and the right most segment with a 0 → 1 transition is due to the
presence of a segment with all 1’s (see all cases without carry). However this all 1’s
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segment contributes zero number of 1’s to the sum. Therefore we subtract 1 from
ul + dn
l
e. Therefore the maximum possible value of H(r + t2−i) is ul + dn
l
e − 1.
Suppose a segment t′ has more than one runs. Then it must contain a 1 → 0
transition. In our analysis of segments with single runs, we assumed that each
segment with a 1 → 0 transition must contribute l number of 1’s to the sum.
As the size of the segment is l the contribution of a segment with more than one
runs must be less than or equal to the contribution of the segment with one run.




Proof of Theorem 1.
The assertion follows directly from Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Proposition 1. 2
5.5.1 Impact of Theorem 1 on Algebraic and Fast Algebraic
Attacks
From the point of view of algebraic attacks on LFSR based stream ciphers, Theo-
rem 1 is particularly significant. It not only gives the upper bound on the AI of
f , i.e., ul + dn
l
e − 1 but at the same time also gives the low degree multiplier g. In
Theorem 1 we give only one multiplier however we can get 2m− 1 distinct non zero
multipliers by taking g(x) = Trm1 (βx
r), where β ∈ F2m . Note only m of them are
linearly independent.
An improvement on the conventional algebraic attacks is the fast algebraic at-
tacks introduced by Courtois in [20] and later improved in [4, 57]. Functions with
high AI may fail to provide resistance against fast algebraic attacks if the degree of
the multiplier g is very low (see [2,13,27]). These attacks improve on conventional
algebraic attacks by adding a pre-computation step which reduces the complexity
of the online step of the attack. Usually the smaller the degree of g, the greater is
the improvement. From Theorem 1 degree of g is d nb√nce, which is sufficiently small.
Therefore an LFSR based stream cipher using nonlinear function f is vulnerable to
fast algebraic attacks.
The first step in both algebraic and fast algebraic attacks is to find low degree
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, where d is the
AI of f [2]. For large values of n (say > 30) and d (say > 15) this computation may
be infeasible. However Theorem 1 immediately gives several low degree relations
for many classes of monomial trace functions regardless of the value of n.
Remark 1 From Fact 1 we know that AI of any function is at most dn
2
e. Let v be



























For many cryptogaphically useful power mappings, u is very small. For example,
u = 1 for inverse, and u = 2 for Kasami, Gold, Welch and Niho. Therefore
Theorem 1 can give very useful bounds for these mappings. In fact in most cases
using the proof technique of Theorem 1 and exploiting the specific binary form
of each exponent, we can further improve this bound. Since functions with Gold
and Welch exponents have very small degrees (2 and 3 respectively) we will only
consider inverse, Kasami, Niho and Dobbertin exponents in this chapter.
5.6 Inverse Exponent
Inverse mappings x → x−1 in F2n can be decomposed in n monomial trace functions
of the form Trn1 (βx
−1). The degree of these monomial trace functions is n − 1.
Among all bijective Boolean functions, degree n−1 is only achieved by the monomial
trace functions with inverse exponent. The inverse exponent consists of a single
run of 1’s. From Theorem 1 its AI is upper bounded by l + dn
l
e − 1. However




Lemma 3 Let t = 2n−1 − 1. Then H(r + t2−i) ≤ l + dn
l
e − 2, 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and
r is defined as in Theorem 1.
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01 · · · 11
︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 · · · 11 . . . . . .
︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 · · · 11
︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 · · · 11
r = 00 · · · 01 00 · · · 01 . . . . . . 00 · · · 01 00 · · · 01
+ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
10 · · · 01︸ ︷︷ ︸ 00 · · · 01︸ ︷︷ ︸ . . . . . . 00 · · · 01︸ ︷︷ ︸ 00 · · · 00︸ ︷︷ ︸
2 1 1 0
H(r + t) = dn
l




11 · · · 01
︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 · · · 11 . . . . . .
︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 · · · 11
︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 · · · 11
r = 00 · · · 01 00 · · · 01 . . . . . . 00 · · · 01 00 · · · 01
+ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
11 · · · 11︸ ︷︷ ︸ 00 · · · 01︸ ︷︷ ︸ . . . . . . 00 · · · 01︸ ︷︷ ︸ 00 · · · 00︸ ︷︷ ︸
l 1 1 0
H(r + t2−(l−2)) = l + dn
l
e − 2. Therefore H(r + t2−i) ≤ l + dn
l
e − 2, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
2
Theorem 2 Let f(x) = Trn1 (βx
−1) and g(x) = Trm1 (x
r). Then





where β, m, r and l are the same as defined in Theorem 1.
Proof. From Lemma 3, t = 2n−1 − 1. Since Trn1 (x) = Trn1 (x2), we have
f(x) = Trn1 (βx
−1) = Trn1 (βx
2t) = Trn1 (β
2n−1xt). (5.4)
From Lemma 1, r is a coset leader and from Lemma 3, Eqn.( 5.4 ) and Proposition 1,
deg(f(x)g(x)) ≤ l + dn
l
e − 2. 2
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In their Eurocrypt 2006 paper [2] Armknecht et al. experimentally determined
the exact AI of the monomial trace functions with inverse exponents for 12 ≤ n ≤
20. Their results are the same as the upper bound given in Theorem 2. This shows
that our bound is tight for these values of n. We believe that this bound is (very
likely) tight for all values of n. Also note that this bound on AI is much less than
theoretical optimal value dn
2
e for higher values of n (see Table 5.1).
5.7 Kasami and Kasami-Like Exponents
A Kasami exponent [59], e, is defined as e = 22s−2s+1, gcd(n, s)=1 and 1 ≤ s ≤ n
2
.
If we remove the condition gcd(n, s)=1 we can write é = 22s − 2s + 1, 1 ≤ s ≤ n
2
.
We will call é, the Kasami-like exponent. The motivation behind studying Kasami-
like exponents, instead of only Kasami exponents, comes from [2]. The authors
of [2] experimentally determined the AI of Kasami and Kasami-like exponents for
12 ≤ n ≤ 20. Based on their results, they suggested that such functions have high
AI. However we show that monomial trace functions with Kasami or Kasami-like
exponents have poor AI for larger values of n. Also by considering Kasami-like
exponents we get a much larger class of functions with AI upper bounds the same
as Kasami exponents.
An n variable monomial trace function with a Kasami-like exponent, f(x), can
be defined as f(x) = Trn1 (βx
é). The algebraic degree of f(x) is s+1. The Kasami-
like exponents consist of 2 runs of 1’s in their binary representation. From Theo-
rem 1 their AI is upper bounded by 2l + dn
l
e − 1. However in Theorem 3 we show
that this bound can be improved further.
Lemma 4 Let t = é2−s where é = 22s − 2s + 1, 1 ≤ s ≤ n
2
. Then












⌉− 1, s ≡ 1 mod l
where 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and r is defined in Theorem 1.
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Proof. The binary representation of é is:
n− 2s s s
é = 22s − 2s + 1 =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 00
︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 · · · 11
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01 .
Let t = é2−s, then
s n− 2s s
t = 22s − 2s + 1 =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 00
︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 · · · 11 .
Consider the addition of r and t.
Case 1: s 6≡ 1 mod l
The binary representation of t has 2 runs of 1’s out of which one run consists of
single 1. This 1 can only contribute a single 1 in any segment of r + t2−i. Now we




11 · · · 10
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 00 . . . . . .
︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 100
︷ ︸︸ ︷
001 · · · 11 . . . . . .
︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 · · · 11
r = 00 · · · 01 00 · · · 01 . . . . . . 0 · · · 001 000 · · · 01 . . . . . . 00 · · · 01
+ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
11 · · · 11︸ ︷︷ ︸ 00 · · · 01︸ ︷︷ ︸ . . . . . . 0 · · · 101︸ ︷︷ ︸ 010 · · · 01︸ ︷︷ ︸ . . . . . . 00 · · · 00︸ ︷︷ ︸
l 1 2 2 0
H(r + t2−(l−1)) = l + dn
l
e.
Case 2: s ≡ 1 mod l
When i = l−1, the run with a single 1, in the binary representation of t2−i, is always
at the least significant position of a segment. Therefore it does not contribute an





11 · · · 10
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 00 . . . . . .
︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 001
︷ ︸︸ ︷
001 · · · 11 . . . . . .
︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 · · · 11
r = 00 · · · 01 00 · · · 01 . . . . . . 0 · · · 001 000 · · · 01 . . . . . . 00 · · · 01
+ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
11 · · · 11︸ ︷︷ ︸ 00 · · · 01︸ ︷︷ ︸ . . . . . . 0 · · · 010︸ ︷︷ ︸ 010 · · · 01︸ ︷︷ ︸ . . . . . . 00 · · · 00︸ ︷︷ ︸
l 1 1 2 0
H(r + t2−(l−1)) = l + dn
l
e-1. 2
Theorem 3 Let f(x) = Trn1 (βx













⌉− 1, s ≡ 1 mod l
where β, l and g(x) are defined in Theorem 1.
Proof. Let t = é2−s, then
f(x) = Trn1 (βx
é) = Trn1 (βx
t2s) = Trn1 (β
2n−sxt), (5.5)
since Trn1 (x) = Tr
n
1 (x
2). The assertion follows directly from Lemma 4, Lemma 1,
Eqn.( 5.5) and Proposition 1. 2
In [2] the exact AI of the monomial trace functions with Kasami-like exponents
for 12 ≤ n ≤ 20 is determined experimentally. For n = 19 the results agree with
our bound. For the remaining values of n the results are very close to our bound.
Remark 2 In Theorem 3 bound on AI is proved for Kasami-like exponents. Since
Kasami exponents are a subset of Kasami-like exponents these bounds also hold for
Kasami exponents. Note that these bounds are much lower than the optimal bound
dn
2
e for large n (see Table 5.1).
Remark 3 For cryptographic applications it is desirable for a Boolean function to
have high degree. Let f(x) = Trn1 (βx
e) be a maximum degree function such that e
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is a Kasami exponent. If n is odd then degree of f(x) is n+1
2
and it is easy to see
that the binary representation of e consists of one run with a single 1 followed by
one run with a single 0. Only one of this run can contribute an additional 1 in a
segment of r + t2−i. Therefore the AI of an odd variable, highest degree monomial
trace function with Kasami exponent is upper bounded by l + dn
l
e − 1.
5.8 Niho and Dobbertin Exponents
First we consider Niho exponent. An n variable monomial trace function with Niho
exponent [35,91], f(x), can be defined as f(x) = Trn1 (βx
e), where e = 2s + 2
s
2 − 1,
n = 2s + 1 when s is even and e = 2s + 2
3s+1
2 − 1, n = 2s + 1 when s is odd. The
degree of Niho function in n variables is n+3
4
for n ≡ 1 mod 4 and n+1
2
for n ≡ 3
mod 4.
The Niho exponent consists of 2 runs of 1’s in its binary representation. From
Theorem 1 its AI is upper bounded by 2l + dn
l
e − 1. However we improve this
bound in Theorem 4.
Lemma 5 Let t = e be a Niho’s exponent. Then








⌉− 1, s ≡ 0 mod l, s is even or







where 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and r is defined in Theorem 1.
Proof. The binary representation of t is:




t = 2s + 2
s
2 − 1 =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 00
︷ ︸︸ ︷






t = 2s + 2
s
2 − 1 =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 00
︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 · · · 11, n = 2s + 1, s is odd
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The binary representation of t has 2 runs of 1’s out of which one run consists of
single 1. This 1 can only contribute a single 1 in any segment of r + t. As in
Lemma 4 it is easy to verify that H(r + t2−i) is maximized when i = l − 1. If
s ≡ 0 mod l and s is even or s ≡ 1 mod l and s is odd, then the run with a single
1, in the binary representation of t2−i, is always at the least significant position of
a segment. Therefore it does not contribute an additional 1 in the corresponding
segment of r + t (see Lemma 4). So H(r + t2−(l−1)) is given by l + dn
l
e − 1.
In all the other cases this 1 can contribute an additional 1 in the corresponding
segment of r + t, and therefore in such cases H(r + t2−(l−1)) is given by l + dn
l
e. 2
Theorem 4 Let f(x) = Trn1 (βx









⌉− 1, s ≡ 0 mod l, s is even or







where β, l and g(x) are defined in Theorem 1.
Proof. The assertion follows directly from Lemma 5, Lemma 1, and Proposition 1.
2
Now we consider Dobbertin exponent. An n variable monomial trace function
with Dobbertin exponent [35], f(x), can be defined as f(x) = Trn1 (βx
e), where
e = 24s + 23s + 22s + 2s − 1 and n = 5s. The degree of f(x) is s + 3. The binary
representation of e has 4 runs of 1’s. From Theorem 1 its AI is upper bounded by
4l + dn
l
e − 1. However in Theorem 5 we show that AI of f(x) is upper bounded
by l + dn
l
e+ 2.
Theorem 5 Let f(x) = Trn1 (βx
e),where e is a Dobbertin exponent. Then
deg(f(x)g(x) ≤ l + dn
l
e+ 2
where β, l, and g(x) are defined in Theorem 1.
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Proof. Let t = e. Then the binary representation of t is:
s s s s s
t =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 00
︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 · · · 11
Using the proof techniques from Lemmas 3, 4 and 5 it can easily be verified that
maximum value of H(r + t2−i) is l + dn
l
e+ 2, where 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and r is defined
in Theorem 1. Now the proof follows directly from Lemma 1, and Proposition 1. 2
Note that the degree of f(x) is very small. From Eqn. (5.2) this bound is only
useful if n ≥ 100. This might not be of practical significance at present but we
have provided the bound for the sake of theoretical interest.
5.9 Comparative Study of our AI Bound
Now we compare our bound on theAI with the bound given in Fact 1, and the exact
AI, obtained experimentally, in [2]. Table 5.1 shows how the upper bound on the
AI of monomial trace functions with Inverse, Kasami and Niho exponents decreases
as n increases. Table 5.2 compares our bound with the exactAI obtained in [2]. For
n = 16 and 20 (a * in table) functions with Kasami-like exponents were modified
in [2] to make them balanced. Therefore for n = 16 and 20 comparison with our
bound is not valid. Note that for n ≤ 20 our bound is tight for inverse exponent and
is very close to the exact AI for Kasami exponent. Also the experimental results
suggest that AI of Kasami exponent is better than inverse exponent. However it is
clear from Theorems 2 and 3 that the difference between the upper bound on their
AI is at most 2 irrespective of the value of n.
83
Table 5.1: AI bounds for Inverse, Kasami and Niho functions





) Our bound on AI
Inverse 16 15 8 6
36 35 18 10
100 99 50 18
Kasami 16 8 8 8
36 18 18 12
100 50 50 20
Niho 15 8 8 8
35 18 18 12
99 50 50 20
Table 5.2: Comparison of our AI bound with experimental results from [2]
n Inverse Kasami
Exact AI Our bound s Exact AI Our bound
13 6 6 5 6 8
14 6 6 6 6 8
15 6 6 6 7 8
16 6 6 7 7∗ 8
17 7 7 7 8 9
18 7 7 8 8 9
19 7 7 8 9 9
20 7 7 9 9∗ 8
100 X 18 49 X 20
5.10 Generalization to Polynomial Functions






k), Ak ∈ F2nk , x ∈ F2n ,
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which is simply a sum of monomial trace functions. If we only consider monomial
trace functions as multipliers the result in Theorem 1 can be generalized to all
balanced polynomial functions. Let uk be the number of runs of 1’s in the binary
representation of k and u = maxk∈Γ(n){uk} such that Ak 6= 0. Let g(x) be a
monomial trace function defined in Theorem 1. Then





To obtain a meaningful bound on AI of f , u must satisfy Eqn. (5.2). The above
result implies that AI of f is upper bounded by the maximum AI of the single
trace functions in the polynomial representation of f .
5.11 AI of WG and Hyper-bent Functions
So far in this chapter we have restricted our discussion to the AI of monomial
trace functions. In Section 5.10 we generalized our results to all polynomial func-
tions however this bound is not tight. In the absence of tight bounds for general
polynomial functions we present some experimental results on the AI of two other
cryptographically significant functions, i.e., WG and Hyper-bent.
We begin with the definition of a bent function. A bent function, f , is a function







where n is even and we write n = 2m. A bent function is called a hyper-bent
function [116] if,







Table 5.3: AI of WG tranformations





7 4 18 0 - -
8 4 16 1 3 3
10 5 60 2 4 4
11 5 176 0 - -
13 6 631 0 - -
Hyper-bent functions are important cryptographic functions as they have the max-
imum nonlinearity (minimum distance from all affine functions). A hyper-bent
function f in n variables has degree d = n/2 where n is even. We have used the
algorithm given in [55] to test hyper-bent functions for algebraic immunity. Our
exhaustive search shows that all hyper-bent functions in 6 variables(n = 6 and
d = 3) have maximum AI. However our results for n = 8 and n = 10 show that
for about 10 percent of the hyper-bent functions AI = n− 1. We also tested some
functions with n = 12 but were not able to find a Hyper-bent function with AI
less than n− 1.
We introduced WG transformations and their cryptographic properties in Chap-
ter 3. These transformations are balanced with high linear complexity and are first
order resilient. The degree of a WG function in n variables is dn/3e + 1. We
tested all WG functions in n variables where 7 ≤ n ≤ 13. The results are shown
in Table 5.3. For each n we list the degree of the transformation, total number
of WG transformations, the degree of low degree multiplier g, if it exists, and the
degree of product f ∗ g. It is clear from the table that for n = 8 there is only one
transformation whose degree can be reduced by a multiplier g of degree 3. Similarly
for n = 10, two transformations exist whose degree can be reduced by multipliers




In this chapter we used the theory of polynomial functions to provide an upper
bound on AI of monomial trace functions. The low degree multiples were also
obtained directly from the formula for any n. This is particularly useful because
so far there are no known efficient algorithms to find the AI of a function with
large number of inputs. We improved the AI bound on inverse, Kasami, Niho and
Dobbertin functions and showed that their AI is very low. We also generalized our
results to polynomial functions. Finally we presented experimental results on the
AI of WG transformations and Hyper-bent functions. An interesting extension of
this research is to determine the lower bound on theAI of monomial trace functions.
However it seems to be more challenging as it requires proving the non-existence




Algebraic Immunity of S-boxes
In this chapter we investigate the resistance of S-boxes against algebraic attacks.
Courtois defined this resistance in terms of the algebraic immunity of an S-box
which depends on the number and type of linearly independent multivariate equa-
tions it satisfies. This definition is controversial and some researchers believe that
the existence of such equations does not imply that a block cipher is vulnera-
ble to algebraic attacks. They argue that the system of multivariate equations
obtained in these algebraic attacks is hard to solve. On the other hand some algo-
rithms [25,39,40] have been successful in solving such systems but on a smaller scale.
These algorithms are mostly based on heuristics and it is difficult to say how well
they will scale to larger systems such as the one for AES. We believe that although
Courtois definition may not measure the complexity of solving such systems accu-
rately, the existence of these multivariate equations indicate an algebraic weakness
in the design of the S-box. Simple and abundant algebraic relations between the
input and output of nonlinear transformations are not desirable. Therefore we will
use the term algebraic immunity to refer to the absence of low degree multivariate
equations between the input and output of an S-box.
In this chapter our main focus is to develop techniques to find the number of lin-
early independent, multivariate, bi-affine and quadratic equations for S-boxes based
on power mappings. These techniques can be used to obtain the exact number of
equations for any class of power mappings. We present two algorithms to calcu-
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late the number of bi-affine and quadratic equations for any (n, n) S-box based on
power mapping. The time complexity of both algorithms is only O(n2). To design
algebraically immune S-boxes we present four new classes of S-boxes that guaran-
tee zero bi-affine equations and one class of S-boxes that guarantees zero quadratic
equations. We also discuss the algebraic immunity of power mappings based on
Kasami, Niho, Dobbertin, Gold, Welch and Inverse exponents.
To design cryptographically strong S-boxes we also consider their resistance
against other powerful attacks, i.e., linear and differential cryptanalysis. We provide
two new conjectures about the nonlinearity and differentially k-uniform property
of Kasami and Kasami like exponents. Finally we solve an open problem to find
an (n, n) bijective nonlinear S-box with more than 5n quadratic equations and




We begin by reviewing the developments in the field of algebraic attacks on block
ciphers. The first algebraic attack on a block cipher was discussed in [108]. For
recent developments in the area of algebraic attacks on block ciphers see [5, 11, 21,
25, 80, 81]. In [25] Courtois and Pieprzyk showed that AES [26] can be attacked
by solving an overdefined system of algebraic equations. This is possible because
the only nonlinear component in AES, i.e., the S-box, can be expressed as an
overdefined system of algebraic equations. The authors presented an algorithm
called XSL to solve this system of multivariate equations and also introduced the
notion of algebraic immunity, Υ, of S-boxes where Υ is an important parameter
in measuring the complexity of the XSL algorithm. For a F2n → F2n S-box Υ is
defined as Υ = ((t− r)/n)d(t−r)/ne, where r is the number of equations and t is the
number of monomials in these equations. A lower value of r means a higher value
of Υ and therefore higher complexity of the algebraic attack. In [25] the authors
showed that for AES S-box Υ = 222.9 and claimed that for secure ciphers Υ should
be greater than 232.
Inspired by [25] Cheon and Lee [18] developed tools to calculate the number
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of linearly independent multivariate equations for algebraic S-boxes. They used
their results to estimate the algebraic immunity Υ of maximally nonlinear power S-
boxes (based on Gold, Kasami and inverse exponents [34]). However Courtois et al.
disputed their results in [22] by showing that in most cases the number of linearly
independent multivariate equations calculated by them are incorrect. This was
done by experimentally finding the total number of quadratic equations for Gold
and Kasami power S-boxes. Power mappings are of interest because unlike random
permutations, they can be implemented in hardware without a lookup table. This
facilitates compact and fast implementations of S-boxes in hardware.
In [22, Appendix A] Courtois et al. also used the polynomial representation
of the algebraic S-boxes to prove that S-boxes based on inverse mapping in F2n
have 3n− 1 bi-affine equations and 5n− 1 quadratic equations. However they did
not generalize their results to other power S-boxes and only provided experimental
results for S-boxes based on Gold, Dobbertin, Niho, Welch and Kasami exponents.
The largest S-box experimentally tested by them was n = 17. In this chapter
we use the polynomial representations to develop techniques which can be used to
obtain the exact number of bi-affine and quadratic equations for any class of power
mappings. From these techniques we also develop two very simple algorithms which,
given an (n, n) S-box and the exponent of power mapping, calculate the exact
number of bi-affine and quadratic equations respectively. The time complexity
of both algorithms is O(n2) which is very small even for very large S-boxes (for
example n = 220). The algorithms currently available in the literature to find such
equations have time complexities that are exponential in n and therefore impractical
for n > 25. Note however that these algorithms find the actual equations whereas
our algorithms only calculate the number of such equations. Towards designing
S-boxes with highest algebraic immunity, we provide four classes of power S-boxes
that guarantee zero bi-affine equations and one class that guarantees zero quadratic
equations. We examine other cryptographic properties, i.e., nonlinearity, algebraic
degree and uniform differential property of these S-boxes and list cryptographically
strong power S-boxes for n = 8 and 10. We also provide two new conjectures
regarding the nonlinearity and uniform differential property of Kasami like power
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mappings. In addition to this we solve an open problem given in [25, 22] to find
a bijective nonlinear (n, n) S-box with more than 5n quadratic equations. We
conjecture the upper bound on this number to be n(n−1)
2
for even n.
6.2 Bi-affine and Quadratic Equations for Power
Mappings
Let’s fix any arbitrary basis {α0, α1, · · · , αn−1} for F2n . Then F2n and Fn2 are
isomorphic and can be used interchangeably. Consider F : F2n → F2n to be an
S-box based on a power mapping. Such S-boxes are classified according to the
exponent a of the power mapping such that y = F (x) = xa.
Proposition 2 Let h(x, y) =
∑
i,j ai,jxiyj be a bi-affine Boolean function in 2n
variables, where x =
∑n−1
i=0 xiαi, y =
∑n−1
i=0 yiαi and ai,j ∈ F2. Then h(x, y) has a





2ky), bk ∈ F2n .
Proof. Let {α0, ..., αn−1} and {β0, ..., βn−1} be dual bases of F2n and x = x0α0 +
· · · + xn−1αn−1 and y = y0α0 + · · · + yn−1αn−1. Now we can write xi = Trn1 (βix)



















































j vjyj be a Boolean func-
tion in 2n variables where ai,j, vj ∈ F2. Then h(x, y) has a unique polynomial





2k+a) + Trn1 (cx
a), bk, c ∈ F2n .







2ky) and we know∑




j vjβjy) = Tr
n
1 (cy). Putting y = x
a we have the proof.
2
Proposition 3 Let h(y) =
∑
i≤j ai,jyiyj be a Boolean function in n variables,
where ai,j ∈ F2. Then h(y) has a unique polynomial representation in F2n such
that:
• if n is even, n = 2m:





(2m+1)), d0, dk ∈ F2n , dm ∈ F2m .
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• if n is odd, n = 2m + 1:




(2k+1)), d0, dk ∈ F2n .
Proof. Let {α0, ..., αn−1} and {β0, ..., βn−1} be dual bases of F2n , x = x0α0 + · · · +

































Now consider the case when n is even. Note that y and y2 belong to the same
coset. Also for 1 ≤ k < m, y(2k+1) and y(2n−k+1) belong to the same coset. Note
that 2m + 1 belongs to the coset of length m, i.e., |C2m+1| = m. Therefore













i βj + βiβ
2k





i βj. The proof for n odd is similar. 2






i viyi be a
quadratic Boolean function in n variables where ai,j, ei,j, vj ∈ F2. Then h(x, y) has
a unique polynomial representation in F2n such that:
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′ ∈ F2n , dm ∈ F2m .










(2k+1)a), bk, dk, c
′ ∈ F2n .










2k+a) + Trn1 (cx
a).































(2k+1)a) + Trm1 (dmx
(2m+1)a),
where c′ = c + d0. The proof for n odd is similar. 2
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6.2.1 Bi-affine Equations










uixi + z = 0, ai,j, vj, ui, z ∈ F2. (6.1)
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Therefore the number of bi-affine equations, of the form as given in (6.1), is equal
to the number of functions h(x, y) that are affine (i.e.,
∑
i uixi + z).
h(x, y) in (6.2) will be affine in the following cases:
1. If for any 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, H(2k + a) = 1 then Trn1 (bkx2k+a) will give 2n
affine functions (as bk ∈ F2n). Note that only n of these functions are linearly
independent. Similarly if H(a) = 1 we will get n linearly independent functions.
2. If for any 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, H(2k + a) > 1 and 2k + a ∈ Ck′ where |Ck′| =













must be 0 for Trn1 (bkx
2k+a) to be an affine function. Therefore we get 2n−m
′
affine functions. Only n−m′ of these functions are linearly independent. The
same argument holds for Trn1 (cx
a).
3. Let A = {2k + a : 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, H(2k + a) > 1∧ 2k + a /∈ F2m′′ ,m′′ < n}. Now
we define S, the set of exponents such that
S =
{
A ∪ {a}, if H(a) > 1 ∧ a /∈ F2m′ , m′ < n
A, otherwise.
Note that S can be a multiset. If any two exponents from S belong to the same
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coset then they will give 2(2−1)n = 2n affine functions. For example if 2k1 + a
and 2k2 + a (k1 6= k2) belong to the same coset then we can write 2k1 + a =
(2k2 + a)2l where 1 ≤ l ≤ n. Now we have a term Trn1 ((bk1 + (bk2)2l)x2k1+a)
where bk1 + (bk2)
2l can be zero in 2n ways. In general if there exist t exponents
that belong to the same coset , we will have 2(t−1)n affine functions.
4. If a ∈ C2n−1−1 then 2k + a = 2n − 1 for some 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. Then we
have Trn1 (bkx
2n−1) = Trn1 (bk) which can be 0 in 2
n−1 ways. Therefore we have
n−1 linearly independent affine functions. Note C2n−1−1 is the only coset with
Hamming weight n− 1 and the inverse exponent belongs to this coset.
Based on the above 4 cases, we now give Algorithm 1 to compute the total
number of linearly independent bi-affine equations for a given power mapping y = xa
over F2n .
Algorithm 1 Computing number of linearly independent bi-affine equations
Input a, n.
Output Total number of independent bi-affine equations.
1: For given a and 2k +a, 0 ≤ k ≤ n−1, compute their coset leaders in array cst l
and their coset sizes in array cst s;
2: sort array cst l in ascending order and shuffle array cst s accordingly;
3: k ← 0, eqnum ← 0;
4: while k ≤ n do
5: if(H(cst l[k] = 0)): eqnum ← eqnum + (n− 1);
6: elseif(H(cst l[k] = 1)): eqnum ← eqnum + n;
7: elseif(cst s[k] < n)): eqnum ← eqnum + (n− cst s[k]);
8: else
9: while cst l[k] = cst l[k + 1] do
10: eqnum ← eqnum + n; k ← k + 1;
11: k ← k + 1;
Theorem 6 Let y = xa be a power mapping over F2n. Then using Algorithm 1,
the total number of linearly independent bi-affine equations can be computed in time
O(n2).
Proof. In Algorithm 1, step 1 takes time O(n2). Step 2 takes time O(nlog(n)) and
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steps 4-10 take time O(n). Therefore total time complexity is O(n2). Correctness
of Algorithm 1 follows from the 4 cases discussed above.
6.2.2 Quadratic Equations
For a given power mapping y = xa we want to find the number of quadratic















uixi+z = 0, ai,j, bi,j, ci,j, vi, ui, z ∈ F2.
(6.3)
Let h(x, y) be a quadratic function as defined in Corollary 2. Then






































Therefore the number of quadratic equations, of the form as given in (6.3), is equal





Consider n = 2m to be even then h(x, y) in ( 6.4) will be quadratic in the following
cases:
1. If for any 0 ≤ k ≤ n−1, 1 ≤ H(2k+a) ≤ 2 then Trn1 (bkx2k+a) will give n linearly
independent quadratic functions. If for any 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, 1 ≤ H((2k + 1)a) ≤
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2 then Trn1 (dkx
(2k+1)a) will give n linearly independent quadratic functions.
If 1 ≤ H(a) ≤ 2 then Trn1 (c′xa) will give n linearly independent quadratic
functions. If ≤ H((2m + 1)a) ≤ 2 then Trm1 (dmx(2m+1)a) will give m linearly
independent quadratic functions (as dm ∈ F2m).
2. If for any 0 ≤ k ≤ n−1, H(2k +a) > 2 and 2k +a ∈ Ck1 where |Ck1| = m1 < n,
m1|n, then Trn1 (bkx2k+a) will give 2n−m1 quadratic functions. If for any 1 ≤
k ≤ m− 1, H((2k + 1)a) > 2 and (2k + 1)a ∈ Ck2 where |Ck2| = m2 < n, m2|n,
then Trn1 (dkx
(2k+1)a) will give 2n−m2 quadratic functions. If H(a) > 2 and
a ∈ Ck3 where |Ck3| = m3 < n, m3|n, then Trn1 (c′xa) will give 2n−m3 quadratic
functions. If H((2m + 1)a) > 2 and (2m + 1)a ∈ Ck4 where |Ck4| = m4 < m,
then Trm1 (dmx
(2m+1)a) will give 2m−m4 quadratic functions.
3. Let
B = {2k + a : 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, H(2k + a) > 2 ∧ 2k + a /∈ F2m5 ,m5 < n}
∪{(2k + 1)a : 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1, H((2k + 1)a) > 2 ∧ (2k + 1)a /∈ F2m6 ,m6 < n}.
Now we define the set of exponents T such that
T =
{
B ∪ {a}, if H(a) > 2 ∧ a /∈ F2m7 ,m7 < n
B, otherwise
Note T can be a multiset. If any two exponents from T belong to the same
coset then they will give 2(2−1)n = 2n quadratic functions. In general if there
exist t exponents that belong to the same coset, we will have 2(t−1)n quadratic
functions.
4. If a ∈ C2n−1−1 then 2k + a = 2n− 1 for some 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. Therefore we have
n− 1 linearly independent quadratic functions.
Note that odd n can be handled in the similar manner and Algorithm 2 can be
modified accordingly. Based on the above 4 cases, we now give Algorithm 2 to
compute the total number of linearly independent quadratic equations for a given
power mapping y = xa over F2n when n is even.
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Algorithm 2 Computing number of linearly independent quadratic equations
Input a, n = 2m.
Output Total number of independent bi-affine equations.
1: For given a and 2k + a, 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, and (2k + 1)a, 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1, compute
their coset leaders in array cst l and their coset sizes in array cst s;
2: Compute coset leader of (2m + 1)a in cstm l and its coset size in cstm s
3: sort array cst l in ascending order and shuffle array cst s accordingly;
4: k ← 0, eqnum ← 0;
5: while k ≤ n + m− 1 do
6: if(H(cst l[k] = 0)): eqnum ← eqnum + (n− 1);
7: elseif(H(cst l[k] ≤ 2)): eqnum ← eqnum + n;
8: elseif(cst s[k] < n)): eqnum ← eqnum + (n− cst s[k]);
9: else
10: while cst l[k] = cst l[k + 1] do
11: eqnum ← eqnum + n; k ← k + 1;
12: k ← k + 1;
13: if(H(cstm l) ≤ 2):eqnum ← eqnum + n;
14: elseif(cstm s < m):eqnum ← eqnum + (m− cstm s);
From the above discussion we have the following theorem.
Theorem 7 Let y = xa be a power mapping over F2n. Then using Algorithm 2, the
total number of linearly independent quadratic equations can be computed in time
O(n2).
6.3 AI of Cryptographically Significant Power Map-
pings
S-boxes which satisfy zero bi-affine and/or quadratic equations provide optimal re-
sistance against algebraic attacks and therefore are of great interest. In this section
we provide several S-box constructions that satisfy this criteria. A cryptographically
strong S-box must also have high nonlinearity, good uniform differential property,
and high algebraic degree to resist linear, differential, and higher order differential
attacks respectively. Unfortunately there are very few S-boxes that satisfy all the
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above requirements and as n increases, finding these S-boxes becomes extremely
difficult. Therefore we identify classes of S-boxes which provably have all the above
mentioned properties. We also provide experimental results for smaller values of n
to identify good S-boxes and show various tradeoffs involved in the selection of an
S-box.
6.3.1 Power Mappings with Zero Bi-affine Equations
It is easy to see that the probability of a randomly chosen S-box having zero bi-
affine equations is high if n is large [25]. This holds true for S-boxes based on power
mappings as well. For example for n = 8, 18.8 percent power mappings have zero
bi-affine equations. For n = 16, 91.1 percent and for n = 25, 99.9 percent power
mappings satisfy this condition. However note that several highly nonlinear S-boxes
(for example inverse mapping) always have bi-affine equations and therefore it is
important to calculate the exact number of bi-affine equations an S-box satisfies. If
a power mapping is selected randomly then we can use Algorithm 1 in Section 6.2.1
to find the number of bi-affine equations it satisfies. Otherwise any one of the
following S-box constructions can be used. Consider the power mapping y = xa
over F2n . From Section 6.2.1, the three necessary and sufficient conditions for the
power mapping to have zero bi-affine equations are:
1. H(a) > 1 and H(2i + a) > 1, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
2. (2i + a)2l 6≡ (2i + a) mod 2n − 1, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and a2l 6≡ a mod 2n − 1, l < n.
3. (2i + a)2l 6≡ (2j + a) mod 2n− 1, i 6= j, 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n− 1 and a2l 6≡ (2k + a) mod
2n − 1, 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, l < n.
Now we provide four (n, n) power S-box constructions which have zero bi-affine
equations. The first construction, given in Theorem 8, consists of S-box based on
Kasami-like exponents (see Section 6.3.3). A subclass of these exponenets, called
Kasami exponents was studied by Dobbertin in [34] and mappings based on these
exponents were shown to be APN.
Theorem 8 Let n = 2m,n ≥ 8 and a = 2m+1 + 2m−1 − 1. Then power mapping
y = xa over F2n has no bi-affine equations.
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00 · · · 010
︷ ︸︸ ︷
011 · · · 11
2i = 00 · · · · · · 001︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
1. H(a) > 1 and from the binary representation of a it is obvious that H(2i+a) >
1, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
2. If 2i + a,∈ Cz, 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 where |Cz| < n then |Cz| divides n. This
means that binary representation of 2i + a must contain at least 2 runs of 1’s
of the same length and 2 runs of 0’s of same length. We have 2 runs of 1’s
when i = 0,m − 1,m, m + 1,m + 2, 2m − 1. However in all these cases the
lengths of the 2 run’s of 1’s is always different. For all the other cases we get
3 runs of 1’s, however they will never be of the same length (we always have
1 run of length 1 and 1 run of length more than 1). Therefore |Cz| = n and
(2i + a)2l 6≡ (2i + a), l < n. Also it is evident from the binary representation of
a that a2l 6≡ (2k + a), k < l.
3. We know that if two integers b and c belong to the same coset then some cyclic
shift of binary representation of b gives c. H(2i +a) = i+2, 0 ≤ i ≤ m−1, i.e.,
all belong to distinct cosets. H(2i +a) = m, i = m−2,m+1 but the number of
runs of 1’s is different in the two cases. H(2i +a) = m+1,m ≤ i ≤ 2m−1, i 6=
m + 1. Although the Hamming weight in all these cases is same but either the
run’s of 1’s and 0’s are of different length or they appear in different order.
Therefore it is not possible to get one integer from the cyclic shift of the binary
representation of another element. Therefore for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, 2i + a
belongs to a distinct coset. Also H(a) = H(2i +a) only when i = m−2,m+1,
however in both cases the length of run’s of 0’s is different from a.
The three necessary and sufficient conditions for y = xa to have zero bi-affine
equations (from Section 6.3.1) are satisfied. 2
Note that this mapping is maximally nonlinear, has high algebraic degree and
good uniform differential property (See Section 6.3.3).
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Theorem 9 Let n ≥ 8 and a = 1 + 2 + ∑ri=3 2i, 3 ≤ r ≤ n − 3. Then power
mapping y = xa over F2n has zero bi-affine equations except when n = 8, r = 5.
Proof. Consider the binary representation of a





0 · · · 0
︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 · · · 1011
1. H(a) > 1 and from the binary representation of a, H(2i +a) > 1, 0 ≤ i ≤ n−1.
2. If 2i + a,∈ Cz, 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 where |Cz| < n then |Cz| divides n. This means
that for even n binary representation of 2i+a must contain at least 2 runs of 1’s
of the same length and 2 runs of 0’s of same length. We get 2 runs of 1’s when
i = 1, 3, r + 1, n− 1. Except for the case where n = 8, r = 5, i = 7, 2i + a can
never fulfill this condition. We get 3 runs of 1’s when 4 ≤ i ≤ n− 2, i 6= r + 1.
However we always have 1 run of 1’s of length 1 and one run of 1’s of length 2
so the above condition is not satisfied. More than 3 runs are impossible in the
binary representation of 2i + a. For odd n we must have at least 3 runs of 1’s
of same length in the binary representation of 2i + a which is impossible from
the above reasoning. Therefore |Cz| = n and (2i + a)2l 6≡ (2i + a), l < n. Also
it is evident from the binary representation of a that a2l 6≡ (2k + a), k < l.
3. We know that if two integers b and c belong to the same coset then some cyclic
shift of binary representation of b gives c. The binary representation of 2i + a
has 1 run of 1’s when i = 0, 2, however the length of the run is different for i = 0
and i = 2. We have 2 runs of 1’s when i = 1, 3, r + 1, n− 1, however either the
length of run’s of 1’s and 0’s is different in each case or the runs of 1’s and 0’s
appear in a different order. We have 3 runs of 1’s when 4 ≤ i ≤ n−2, i 6= r+1.
For each 4 ≤ i ≤ k, 2i + a will have a different Hamming weight. For each
k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 2, 2i + a has same Hamming weight but either the run’s of 1’s
and 0’s are of different length or they appear in different order. Therefore for
each 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, 2i + a belongs to a distinct coset. Also H(a) = H(2i + a)
only when i = 1, k, however in both cases the length of run’s of 1’s is different
from a.
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The 3 necessary and sufficient conditions for y = xa to have zero bi-affine equations
(from Section 6.3.1) are satisfied. 2
The proof technique for Theorems 10 and 11 is similar to that of Theorems 8
and 9. So we provide the theorems without proof.
Theorem 10 Let n ≥ 8, and a = 1 + ∑ri=2 2i = 2r+1 − 3, 3 ≤ r ≤ n − 3. Then
power mapping y = xa over F2n has zero bi-affine equations except when n is even
and r = n
2
− 1.
Theorem 11 Let n ≥ 8, and a = 1 + 2 + 22 + ∑ri=4 2i = 2r+1 − 9, 4 ≤ r ≤ n− 3.
Then power mapping y = xa over F2n has zero bi-affine equations except for the
following: (n = 8, r = 5), (n = 9, r = 5, 6) and (n = 10, r = 7).
Several mappings in the constructions given above have good nonlinearity and
uniform differential property. For example consider the construction given in The-
orem 9. For n = 8 power mapping y = x11 has nonlinearity 96 and is differentially
10-uniform. For n = 10 power mapping y = x11 has nonlinearity 480 and is dif-
ferentially 10-uniform and for n = 12 power mapping y = x27 has nonlinearity 472
and is differentially 6-uniform. Similarly for construction given in Theorem 10 the
mapping y = x13 in F210 , has nonlinearity 480 and is differentially 4-uniform. For
n = 12, mapping y = x1021 has nonlinearity 1952 and is differentially 16-uniform.
6.3.2 Power Mappings with Zero Quadratic Equations
If a power mapping is selected randomly then we can use Algorithm 2 given in
Section 6.2.2 to calculate the number of quadratic equations it satisfies. Otherwise
we provide a construction below to obtain S-box with zero quadratic equations.
Consider the power mapping y = xa on F2n . We consider the case where n = 2m is
even. The case where n is odd is similar. From Section 6.2.2, the 3 necessary and
sufficient conditions for the power mapping to have zero quadratic equations are:
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1.
H(a) > 2, and H(2i + a) > 2, and
H((2k + 1)a) > 2, and H((2m + 1)a) > 2, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1.
2.
(2i + a)2l 6≡ (2i + a) mod 2n − 1, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, l < n, and
a2l 6≡ a mod 2n − 1, l < n, and
(2k + 1)a2l 6≡ (2k + 1)a, mod 2n − 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1, l < n, and
(2m + 1)a2l1 6≡ (2m + 1)a, mod 2n − 1, l1 < m.
3. Let
C = {2i + a : 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1} ∪ {(2j + 1)a : 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1} ∪ {a} ∪ {(2m + 1)a}.
C can be a multiset. Then any two elements in C belong to different cosets
modulo (2n − 1).
Theorem 12 Let n ≥ 8, and a = 1 + 2 + ∑ri=3 2i, 4 ≤ r ≤ n − 3. Then power
mapping y = xa over F2n has zero quadratic equations except for the following:
(n = 8, r = 5), (n = 9), (n = 10, r = 5) and (n = 12, r = 4, 8).




00 · · · 0
︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 · · · 11 011
First we consider the case n = 2m, l < q. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the run
distribution (lengths of runs of 1’s and 0’s) of the binary representation of (2i +
a), 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and (2k + 1)a, 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1 respectively. For example a run
distribution 4, 3, 1, 2 represents the binary form 0000111011 which is 59 in decimal
representation. Note that underlined digits represent the length of run of 1’s. For
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k = l in Table 6.2, there are three different cases for different values of l and for
k = l + 1 there are 2 different cases for different values of l.
1. From the binary representation of a, Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 it is obvious that
H(a) > 3, H(2i + a) > 2, H((2k + 1)a) > 2 and H((2m + 1)a) > 2, 0 ≤ i ≤
n− 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1.
2. If 2i + a, 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 ∈ Cz where |Cz| < n then |Cz| divides n and binary
representation of 2i + a is periodic with period |Cz|. It is clear from Table 6.1
that the binary representation of 2i + a is never periodic with period less than
n. The same reasoning holds for (2k +1)a, 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1 (see Table 6.2). Also
from the binary representation of a it is obvious that |Ca| = n. Similarly it is
easy to check that (2m + 1)a2l1 6≡ (2m + 1)a mod 2n − 1, l1 < m.
3. If two integers b and c belong to the same coset then some cyclic shift of binary
representation of b gives c. This means that both b and c must have same
Hamming weight, the number of runs of 1’s and 0’s must be identical and they
must appear in the same order (cyclic). From the binary representations of a
and (2m + 1)a, Tables 6.1 and 6.2, it is clear that no two elements of the set C
(see item 3 of Section 6.3.2) belong to the same coset.
For n = 2m, l ≥ q, the run distribution of (2i + a) is the same as in Table 6.1.
If k < q then the run distribution of (2k + 1)a is the same as given in Table 6.2.
Therefore for k < q items 1, 2 and 3 hold with similar logic. For k ≥ q, (a2k + a)
may generate a carry which results in many possible run distributions depending
on the actual value of a. Therefore representing the run distribution of (a2k + a)
in a tabular form becomes cumbersome. It is tedious (but not very hard) to check
that items 1, 2 and 3 hold for k ≥ q as well. Proof for odd n is very similar. 2
It can be proved easily that if n is even and r = n−3 then power mapping y = xa in
Theorem 12 is bijective if and only if n 6≡ 0 mod 18. Also if r = n−5 then the above
mapping is bijective if and only if n 6≡ 0 mod 78. So if n < lcm(18, 78) = 234, then
by taking r to be either n−3 or n−5 we will always get a bijective S-box. Note that
bijective mappings exist for many other values of r as well when r is odd. Similar
conditions can be found for odd n easily. The power mapping in Theorem 12 is a
subset of the power mapping given in Theorem 9 and several mappings with good
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Table 6.1: Run distribution in the binary representation of (2i + a)
i run distribution in(2i + a) i run distribution in(2i + a)
0 q,l + 1,2 l + 2 q − 1,1,1,l − 1,1,2
1 q,l + 1,1,1 l + 3 q − 1,l + 1,1,2
2 q,l + 3 l+4 q − 2,1,1,l,1,2
3 q − 1,1,l + 1,2 l + 5 q − 3,1,2,l,1,2
4 q − 1,1,l − 1,1,1,2 l + 6 q − 4,1,3,l,1,2
·· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
5 q − 1,1,l − 2,2,1,2 n− 1 1,q − 1,l,1,2
·· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Table 6.2: Run distribution in the binary representation of (2k + 1)a
k run distribution in(2k + 1)a k run distribution in(2k + 1)a
1 q − 2,1,1,l − 1,3,1 l + 1 q − k,l + 2,1,l − 2,1,2 (l > 2)
q − 3,4,2,2 (l = 2)
2 q − 3,1,2,l − 2,2,3 l + 2 q − k,l + 1,2,l − 1,1,2
3 q − 4,1,3,l − 3,1,1,2,2 l + 3 q − k,l,1,l + 2,1,2
4 q − 5,1,4,l − 4,1,1,1,1,1,2 l + 4 q − k,l,1,2,1,l,1,2
5 q − 6,1,5,l − 5,1,1,1,2,1,2 l + 5 q − k,l,1,2,2,l,1,2
6 q − 7,1,6,l − 6,1,1,1,3,1,2 l+6 q − k,l,1,2,3,l,1,2
·· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
l q − l − 1,1,l + 1,1,1,l − 3,1,2 (l > 3) m− 1 q − k,l,1,2,m− l − 4,l,1,2
q − 3,1,4,3 (l = 2)
q − 4,1,4,1,2,2 (l = 3)
nonlinearity and uniform differential property listed for Theorem 9 also belong to
the class given in Theorem 12.
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6.3.3 Cryptographically Strong Kasami Like Power Map-
pings
A Kasami exponent [59], é, is defined as é = 22s−2s+1, gcd(n, s)=1 and 1 ≤ s < n
2
.
If we remove the condition gcd(n, s)=1 we can write e = 22s − 2s + 1, 1 ≤ s < n
2
.
We will call e, the Kasami like exponent. Suppose n = 2m, and we take s = m− 1
then we have e = 22m−2 − 2m−1 + 1 and a = 2m+1e = 2m+1 + 2m−1 − 1. Note that
a is the same exponent as in Theorem 8 which has zero bi-affine equations. Based
on our extensive experimental results we provide two new conjectures.
Conjecture 1 Let n = 2m, m is even, and a = 2m+1 + 2m−1 − 1. Then mapping
y = xa is maximally nonlinear.
The validity of Conjecture 1 has been verified up to n = 24. Note that since m is
even, gcd(m−1, n) = 1 and therefore the mapping y = xa is known to be APN [34].
Also this mapping is provably non-bijective.
Conjecture 2 Let n = 2m, m is odd, and a = 2m+1 + 2m−1 − 1. Then mapping
y = xa is differentially 4-uniform.
The validity of Conjecture 2 has been verified up to n = 22. Note that gcd(m −
1, n) = 2 and therefore the mapping y = xa is known to be maximally nonlinear [33].
Also this mapping is always bijective. Now we provide the following theorem with-
out proof. The proof technique is very similar to the one used in Theorem 12.
Theorem 13 Let n = 2m,n ≥ 8 and a = 2m+1 + 2m−1 − 1. Then power mapping
y = xa over F2n has 2n quadratic equations.
Note that this mapping has zero bi-affine equations (see Theorem 8), is maxi-
mally nonlinear, has high algebraic degree and good uniform differential property.
Therefore it is a suitable candidate for cryptographic applications.
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Table 6.3: Power mappings with zero bi-affine equations
n a deg(F ) nl(F ) k − unf. n a deg(F ) nl(F ) k − unf.
8 11 3 96 10 10 71 4 464 6
23 4 96 16 79 5 480 4
29 4 96 10 89 4 472 6
61 5 96 16 109 5 448 34
10 13 3 480 4 119 6 464 6
19 3 468 6 125 6 448 34
23 4 472 6 151 5 464 6
43 4 464 6 175 6 464 6
47 5 448 34 191 7 464 6
53 4 432 34 221 6 448 34
59 5 464 6 245 6 464 6
61 5 464 6 251 7 432 34
6.3.4 AI of Some Well Known Power Mappings
Dobbertin investigated some well known power mappings in [34], i.e., Gold, Dob-
bertin, Niho, Welch, inverse and Kasami. The number of bi-affine and quadratic
equations for some of these power mappings have been found experimentally in [22]
(for n ≤ 17). However using the proof techniques given in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2
the exact number of bi-affine and quadratic equations for the above power mappings
can be determined easily. For example Niho exponent e is defined as e = 2s+2
s
2−1,
n = 2s+1 when s is even and e = 2s +2
3s+1
2 −1, n = 2s+1 when s is odd. It can be
easily proved that power mapping y = xe has zero bi-affine equations for n ≥ 7 and
n quadratic equations for n > 7. Since power mapping based on Niho exponent is
maximally nonlinear and APN for odd n, it is a good choice for a cryptographically
strong S-box in odd number of variables.
The power mapping with Dobbertin exponent although APN is not maximally
nonlinear and its algebraic degree is only n
5
+ 3. The algebraic degrees of power
mappings with Gold and Welch exponents are 2 and 3 respectively. Therefore these
mappings may not be of cryptographic interest for large values of n.
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Table 6.4: Power mappings with zero quadratic equations
n a deg(F ) nl(F ) k − unf. n a deg(F ) nl(F ) k − unf.
8 27* 4 80 26 10 105* 4 480 10
10 27* 4 472 6 111* 6 432 6
45* 4 432 6 117* 5 480 6
51* 4 432 8 123* 6 392 32
53 4 432 34 183* 6 448 32
75* 4 480 6 237* 6 480 4
87* 5 480 4 251 7 432 34
6.4 Experimental Results
In this section we give some cryptographically significant power mappings. Table 6.3
shows all bijective power mappings which have zero bi-affine equations for n = 8
and 10. The second column in the table lists the exponents a. Note that a is
always the coset leader. The other exponents in the same coset, although not
listed in the table, have same properties. The third, fourth and fifth columns show
the algebraic degree, nonlinearity and differential uniform property of the mapping
respectively. The AES S-box (inverse mapping) has degree 7, nonlinearity 112, and
is differentially 4-uniform. From Table 6.3 it is clear that for n = 8, no bijective
power mapping having zero bi-affine equations is as good as AES S-box. For n = 10
the optimal bijective power mapping with zero bilinear equations has exponent 79.
This mapping has the same nonlinearity and differential uniform property as the
inverse mapping, however there is a tradeoff between the degree and the number of
bilinear equations. The inverse mapping has 29 bi-affine equations and its degree is
9 whereas the mapping with exponent 79 has zero bilinear equations and its degree
is 5. Note that exponent 79 for n = 10 is the same as defined in Theorems 8 and 13.
Table 6.4 shows power mappings which have zero quadratic equations for n = 8
and 10. An ∗ in the second column indicates that the mapping is non-bijective.
From the table it is clear that for n = 8 and 10, there is no cryptographically good
bijective power mapping with zero quadratic equations.
Table 6.5 shows maximally nonlinear bijective power mappings for n = 8 and
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Table 6.5: Maximally nonlinear power mappings
n a deg(F ) nl(F ) k − unf. bi-affine eqns. quadratic eqns.
8 31 5 112 16 16 36
91 5 112 16 16 36
127 7 112 4 23 39
10 5 2 480 4 10 40
13 3 480 4 0 20
17 2 480 4 15 40
25 3 480 8 5 10
41 3 480 8 5 5
49 3 480 8 5 15
79 5 480 4 0 20
107 5 480 8 5 15
181 5 480 4 15 35
205 5 480 4 10 40
511 9 480 4 29 49
10. Columns six and seven in the table give the number of bi-affine and quadratic
equations respectively. For n = 10, power mappings with exponents 41, 79, and
511 (affine equivalent of inverse exponent) are of cryptographic interest.
Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 are optimal in terms of bi-affine equations, quadratic
equations and nonlinearity respectively. Our experiments show that there does not
exist an S-box (for n ≤ 25) which is optimal in terms of all the properties listed in
Table 6.5. Therefore we must relax our criteria to obtain strong S-boxes.
6.5 Cryptographically Significant Power Mappings
To obtain cryptographically strong S-boxes we require that the S-box based on
power mapping F must have the following properties:
• Bijective.
• 2n−1 − 2n2 +1 ≤ nl(F ) ≤ 2n−1 − 2n2 for n even, and 2n−1 − 2n+12 ≤ nl(F ) ≤
2n−1 − 2n−12 for n odd.
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• At most n bi-affine equations.
• At most differentially k-uniform where k ≤ 6.
• deg(F ) ≥ 3.
For n = 8, no S-box satisfies the above criteria. Therefore we have listed an
S-box which satisfies all the above properties except that it is differentially 10-
uniform. A complete list of all S-boxes (for 7 ≤ n ≤ 15) based on power mappings,
that satisfy the above criteria, is given in Table 6.6.
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7 11 3 56 2 0 21
13 3 56 2 0 21
23 4 56 2 0 21
27 4 56 2 7 28
29 4 56 2 0 21
8 11 3 96 10 0 24
29 4 96 10 0 24
9 13 3 240 2 0 18
19 3 240 2 0 9
27 4 240 2 0 9
45 4 232 4 0 9
47 5 240 2 0 18
59 5 240 2 0 18
87 5 240 2 0 18
103 5 240 2 9 36
125 6 232 4 0 9
10 13 3 480 4 0 20
19 3 464 6 0 10
23 4 472 6 0 10
43 4 464 6 0 10
59 5 464 6 0 10
61 5 464 6 0 10
71 4 464 6 0 10
79 5 480 4 0 20
89 4 472 6 0 10
91 5 464 6 5 5
103 5 464 4 5 5
115 5 464 6 5 15
119 6 464 6 0 10
149 4 464 4 5 5
151 5 464 6 0 10
167 5 456 6 5 5












191 7 464 6 0 10
205 5 480 4 10 40
215 6 464 6 5 5
223 7 472 4 5 5
235 6 464 6 5 5
239 7 456 6 5 5
245 6 464 6 0 10
347 6 464 6 5 15
367 7 472 4 5 5
379 7 464 6 5 5
11 11 3 960 6 0 22
13 3 992 2 0 22
21 3 960 6 11 11
29 4 960 6 0 11
35 3 992 2 0 11
37 3 960 6 0 0
43 4 992 2 0 22
47 5 960 6 0 22
49 3 960 6 0 22
51 4 960 6 0 0
53 4 960 6 0 0
11 55 5 960 6 0 0
57 4 992 2 0 22
67 3 960 6 11 22
71 4 960 6 0 11
73 3 960 6 11 11
75 4 960 6 0 11
79 5 960 4 0 11
81 3 960 6 0 0
83 4 960 6 0 0
85 4 960 6 11 11
95 6 992 2 0 22
99 4 960 6 11 11
101 4 968 6 0 0
103 5 960 6 0 11
107 5 992 2 0 11












113 4 960 6 0 11
117 5 992 2 0 11
121 5 960 6 0 22
125 6 960 6 0 11
139 4 960 6 0 0
143 5 992 2 0 22
149 4 960 6 0 0
151 5 992 2 0 22
153 4 960 6 11 22
157 5 976 6 0 0
159 6 960 6 0 11
167 5 968 6 0 0
171 5 960 6 0 11
173 5 960 6 0 11
179 5 968 6 0 0
181 5 960 6 0 0
183 6 960 4 0 11
185 5 960 6 0 0
187 6 960 6 0 0
189 6 960 6 0 22
191 7 960 6 0 11
201 4 960 6 0 0
203 5 968 6 0 0
205 5 960 6 0 11
213 5 960 6 0 0
215 6 960 6 0 0
217 5 960 6 0 0
219 6 960 6 0 0
221 6 960 6 0 11
223 7 968 6 0 0
229 5 960 6 0 0
231 6 992 2 11 44
247 7 960 6 0 0












251 7 960 4 0 0
295 5 960 6 0 0
301 5 960 6 11 11
11 307 5 960 6 11 22
309 5 960 6 0 0
311 6 960 6 0 0
315 6 992 2 0 22
317 6 960 6 0 0
319 7 960 6 0 11
331 5 968 6 0 0
333 5 960 6 0 0
335 6 960 6 0 0
339 5 976 6 0 0
343 6 960 6 0 11
347 6 960 6 0 0
351 7 960 6 0 0
359 6 960 6 0 0
365 6 992 2 11 44
367 7 960 4 0 0
373 6 960 6 0 0
375 7 960 6 0 0
379 7 960 6 0 11
381 7 960 6 0 0
411 6 992 2 11 44
413 6 992 2 0 22
423 6 960 6 0 22
427 6 960 6 0 0
443 7 960 6 11 11
463 7 960 4 11 11
471 7 960 6 0 11
475 7 960 6 0 0
477 7 960 6 0 0
479 8 960 6 0 11













493 7 960 6 0 11
495 8 960 6 11 11
507 8 968 6 0 0
687 7 960 6 11 11
695 7 960 4 0 0
703 8 960 4 11 11
727 7 960 6 0 0
735 8 960 6 0 0
751 8 960 6 0 0
763 8 968 6 0 0
767 9 960 6 11 22
879 8 960 6 11 11
959 9 960 6 11 11
12 73 3 1984 4 9 9
341 5 1952 6 10 10
731 7 1984 4 9 9
853 6 1952 6 10 10
13 13 3 4032 2 0 26
23 4 3968 6 0 13
35 3 3968 6 0 13
57 4 4032 2 0 26
61 5 3968 6 0 13
67 3 4032 2 0 13
71 4 4032 2 0 13
13 81 3 3968 6 0 0
87 5 3968 6 0 0
107 5 3968 6 0 0
111 6 3968 6 0 0
121 5 3968 6 0 13
133 3 3968 6 0 0
137 3 3968 6 0 0
147 4 3968 6 0 0
151 5 3968 6 0 0












185 5 3968 6 0 0
191 7 4032 2 0 26
197 4 3968 6 0 0
203 5 3968 6 0 0
205 5 3968 6 0 13
221 6 3968 6 0 0
225 4 3968 6 0 13
229 5 3968 6 0 0
231 6 3968 6 0 0
235 6 3968 6 0 0
241 5 4032 2 0 26
243 6 3968 6 0 0
269 4 3968 6 0 0
275 4 3968 6 0 0
281 4 3968 6 0 0
287 6 4032 2 0 26
291 4 3968 6 0 0
299 5 3968 6 0 0
303 6 3968 4 0 0
307 5 3968 6 0 0
309 5 3968 6 0 0
335 6 3968 6 0 0
339 5 3968 6 0 13
347 6 4032 2 0 13
357 5 3968 6 0 0
365 6 3968 6 0 0
367 7 4032 2 0 13
369 5 3968 6 0 0
375 7 3968 6 0 0
379 7 3968 6 0 0
395 5 3968 6 0 0
401 4 3968 6 0 0
405 5 3968 6 0 13













465 5 3968 6 0 0
467 6 3968 6 0 0
555 5 3968 6 0 0
581 4 3968 6 0 0
611 5 3968 6 0 0
613 5 3968 6 0 0
617 5 3968 6 0 0
627 6 3968 6 0 0
631 7 3968 6 0 0
635 7 4032 2 0 26
683 6 3968 6 0 13
13 703 8 3968 6 0 13
717 6 3968 6 0 0
723 6 4032 2 0 26
739 6 3968 6 0 0
749 7 3968 6 0 13
763 8 3968 6 0 0
797 6 3968 6 0 0
807 6 3968 6 0 0
809 5 3968 6 0 0
821 6 3968 6 0 0
855 7 3968 6 0 0
861 7 3968 6 0 0
911 7 4032 2 13 52
915 6 3968 6 0 0
919 7 3968 6 0 13
935 7 3968 6 0 0
941 7 3968 6 0 13
947 7 3968 4 0 0
949 7 3968 6 0 0
1001 7 3968 6 0 0
1243 7 4032 2 13 52
1245 7 4032 2 0 26












1255 7 3968 6 0 0
1323 6 3968 6 0 0
1327 7 3968 6 0 0
1367 7 3968 6 0 13
1389 7 3968 6 0 0
1399 8 3968 6 0 0
1453 7 4032 2 13 52
1463 8 3968 6 0 0
1493 7 3968 6 0 0
1519 9 3968 6 0 0
1639 7 4032 2 13 52
1643 7 3968 6 0 13
1647 8 3968 6 0 0
1691 7 4032 2 0 26
1707 7 3968 6 0 0
1709 7 3968 6 0 0
1781 8 3968 6 0 13
1883 8 3968 6 0 0
1899 8 3968 6 0 0
1979 9 3968 6 0 0
2775 8 3968 6 0 0
14 13 3 8064 4 0 28
53 4 7936 6 0 0
71 4 7968 6 0 14
89 4 8000 6 0 0
139 4 7936 6 0 0
173 5 8000 6 0 0
205 5 8064 4 0 28
241 5 8064 4 0 28
319 7 8064 4 0 28
341 5 8000 6 14 14
355 5 7984 6 7 7
371 6 7968 6 7 7













553 4 7968 6 0 0
583 5 8000 6 0 0
593 4 7936 6 0 0
911 7 8000 6 7 7
923 7 7968 6 0 14
937 6 7936 6 0 0
947 7 8000 6 0 0
979 7 8064 4 0 28
1097 4 8000 6 7 7
1181 6 7968 6 0 0
1193 5 8000 6 7 7
1231 7 7968 6 0 0
1339 7 8064 4 0 28
1387 7 8000 6 7 7
1519 9 7968 6 0 0
1831 7 7936 6 0 14
1835 7 8000 6 0 14
1837 7 7984 6 0 0
1883 8 8000 6 0 0
1939 7 7968 6 7 7
1943 8 7968 6 7 7
2045 10 7968 6 0 14
2491 8 8000 6 0 14
2711 7 8000 6 7 7
2783 9 7936 6 0 0
2893 7 8064 4 14 56
2933 8 7968 6 0 0












3061 9 7968 6 0 0
3277 7 8064 4 14 56
3499 8 8000 6 7 7
3509 8 8000 6 0 0
3517 9 7968 6 0 14
3743 9 7968 6 7 7
3797 8 7936 6 0 0
4015 10 7984 6 7 7
4031 11 7992 6 7 7
5467 8 7936 6 0 14
6007 10 8000 6 14 14
15 13 3 16256 2 0 30
73 3 16128 6 15 15
131 3 16256 2 0 15
241 5 16256 2 0 30
383 8 16256 2 0 30
521 3 16128 6 15 15
1371 7 16256 2 0 15
1935 8 16256 2 15 60
2033 8 16256 2 0 15
2523 8 16256 2 0 30
3671 8 16256 2 0 30
4717 7 16128 6 15 15
4791 8 16256 2 0 30
4815 8 16256 2 0 15
4941 7 16128 6 15 15
6555 8 16256 2 15 60
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6.6 Bijective Power Mappings with Maximum
Quadratic Equations
It was stated to be an open problem in [25,22] to find a bijective nonlinear (n, n) S-
box that would give strictly more than 5n linearly independent quadratic equations.
We provide bijective nonlinear (n, n) S-boxes, where the number of linearly inde-
pendent quadratic equations is much larger than 5n. For example from Algorithm 2
it can be checked that for n = 12 exponent 683 gives 66 quadratic equations. Also
for n = 14, 16, 18, 20 and 24 , exponents 2731, 21847, 43691, 174763 and 2796203
give 91, 120, 153, 190 and 276 quadratic equations respectively. Now we give an
interesting experimental observation.
Conjecture 3 Let y = xa be a bijective nonlinear power mapping over F2n , n ≥
12 and n is even. Then the maximum number of linearly independent quadratic
equations are less than or equal to n(n−1)
2
.
The validity of the conjecture has been verified up to n = 24 and the upper bound
n(n−1)
2
is achieved for n = 12, 14, 16, 18, 20 and 24. For odd n, n ≥ 5, our experi-
mental results suggest that this upper bound is 5n. Also note that for non-bijective




In this chapter we developed techniques to calculate the number of multivariate
bi-affine and quadratic equations for S-boxes based on power mappings. We also
provided two simple and efficient algorithms which are practical even for very large
S-boxes. The S-box constructions given by us in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 have
provable optimalAI. We also gave experimental results for power S-boxes with high
algebraic immunity, nonlinearity, algebraic degree and good uniform differential
property. We identified two classes of Kasami like power mappings with good
AI. One class is known to be APN and we conjectured that it is also maximally
nonlinear. The second class is known to be maximally nonlinear and we conjectured
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that it is also differentially 4-uniform. We also identified bijective nonlinear S-boxes
that have lowest AI and conjectured an upper bound on the number of quadratic






In this chapter we derive equivalent algebraic descriptions of the Inverse and DES
S-boxes to study their algebraic structure and other properties. We derive several
possible algebraic representations of these S-boxes by using different irreducible
polynomials. This study of alternative representation of these S-boxes gives us
good insight into their various algebraic properties.
7.1 Background
S-boxes are essential and often the most important building blocks of a symmetric
cipher. In most ciphers S-boxes are the only nonlinear components. The S-boxes in
a cipher may be all identical as in AES or they may be different from one another as
is the case in DES (Data Encryption Standard). Similarly for some ciphers S-boxes
are specified explicitly in algebraic terms, for example AES, and for other ciphers
simply the input output mapping is provided, i.e., DES. If an S-box is specified in
terms of an input/output table, we can derive an algebraic representation through
interpolation. We will use the tools from finite fields and sequence design to derive
and evaluate the algebraic properties of these S-boxes. The features of our interest
are the degree of the algebraic representations, number of monomial terms in their
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polynomial and trace representations, and linear complexity of the sequences that
correspond to their component functions.
7.2 Equivalent Polynomial Representations of In-
verse S-box
The AES S-Box consists of multiplicative inverse in F28 , defined by the primitive
polynomial x8+x4+x3+x+1, followed by an affine transformation. S-Boxes used in
stream ciphers SNOW1 [37], SNOW2 [38] and SFINKS [14] also use multiplicative
inverse to obtain a highly nonlinear transformation. Therefore we will focus on
this transformation, i.e., F : X → X−1 in F28 defined by the polynomial x8 + x4 +
x3 + x + 1. Note that for the rest of this chapter inverse S-Box means the fixed






i, bi ∈ F2n .
So we can represent the inverse mapping as X → X254 mod 255. This means that in
the polynomial representation coefficient b254 = 1 and all the remaining coefficients
are zero.
Youssef and Gong in [117] showed that for a given input and output of an S-box,
changing the defining polynomial of the finite field is equivalent to performing a
linear transformation at the input of the S-box. In order to see how this transfor-
mation affects the coefficients of the multiplicative inverse function we use Lagrange
interpolation (see Section 2.4). To see the effect of changing the defining polynomial
we first evaluate the function for all the 256 inputs using the irreducible polyno-
mial used in AES, i.e., m(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1. Now we interpolate on this
output using a different irreducible polynomial g(x). Table 7.1 shows the function
calculated by interpolation where g(x) = x8 +x7 +x6 +x4 +x3 +x2 +1. The entries
correspond to the coefficients in hexadecimal format. For example the coefficient
b35 is obtained by selecting 3rd row and 5th column in the table which gives 5F.
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Table 7.1: Equivalent polynomial representation of Inverse S-Box
g(x) = x8 + x7 + x6 + x4 + x3 + x2 + 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
0 0 FE F5 E9 41 FD D9 E7 90 BF 10 EF 8F 4D AF 47
1 33 FC 78 9B 95 FD D4 C7 F1 AC 7D 49 EE 11 CC C1
2 2B 11 E4 36 C8 9 76 B9 AA E3 EF 13 13 62 EA C1
3 E8 81 83 65 73 5F 7B 7F 59 15 87 AB 95 71 C1 34
4 BD F6 F4 A3 E8 E2 98 15 3E 50 AA D5 88 AC FA C0
5 39 A1 36 0 9B 13 9A F1 8C 23 FD FB 64 62 FA C9
6 AE 84 E4 11 2A 46 D3 76 61 27 25 39 5B 78 DF 85
7 4B 9B 18 39 CB 3F 4A B0 27 F9 6E 93 B8 E7 4B 28
8 EA 92 58 86 6D 10 A9 79 A1 B2 9C 4E C3 8 9C 75
9 72 BA 49 2E CE B7 A 20 DE 2A 5B B4 67 4D EA 6A
A 3 89 6D 1 C0 7D 2B 33 B6 37 E6 B2 DF 1B 70 DF
B 90 4A EA 55 40 9F 4F F5 DC D 60 A9 E4 5C B8 A6
C 33 25 F1 8F D2 A7 B1 5B EA 6F 67 5B 62 3D 21 2F
D 70 A2 81 43 51 CF C6 4D 96 E8 B7 EA 22 A4 B9 BA
E 33 CB AB 2 B B8 16 23 74 DC 9A CD 34 EC 3A C3
F ED 2 BD B6 DC 17 5A 5A D5 7C 26 6D 9 8E 1 0
In decimal it translates to b53 = 95. Note that there was only one monomial term
in the original representation but after changing the irreducible polynomial all but
two monomial terms are nonzero. The representations of the inverse function under
all the 28 irreducible polynomials over F2 of degree 8 were obtained and they all
consist of large number of nonzero terms. We have not listed the remaining tables
in this thesis due to the lack of space.
7.3 Trace Representation of Inverse S-box
To compute the trace representation of the inverse S-box we first decompose the
inverse mapping of the S-box (from F28 → F28) into eight component functions as
follows:
F (x) = (f1(x), f2(x), f3(x), f4(x), f5(x), f6(x), f7(x), f8(x))
where each component function is a mapping from F28 → F2. Recall that if f is
balanced its trace representation given by
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k), Ak ∈ F2nk , x ∈ F2n .
where Γ(n) is the set consisting of all coset leaders modulo 2n − 1, nk is the size of
the coset Ck, and Tr
nk
1 (x) is the trace function from F2nk → F2.
To compute the trace representation of these functions we use Discrete Fourier
Transform (see Section 2.3). The trace representation of each component function
under the AES defining polynomial x8 +x4 +x3 +x+1 is shown in Table 7.2. Note
that each function has only one trace term.
The trace representation of the component functions obtained by changing the
defining polynomial to x8 + x6 + x5 + x4 + 1 is shown in Table 7.3. The first
column lists k, the coset leaders modulo 255, and the remaining columns give the
corresponding coefficient, Ak, in the trace term for each component function. For
example the second row and second column in the table represents the trace term
Tr81(78x). The complete trace representation of the function is obtained by the
summation of all the trace terms in the given column. The trace representation
tables of inverse S-box for all 28 irreducible polynomials of degree 8 over F2 were
obtained and they all consist of large number of trace terms. We have not listed
the remaining tables in this thesis due to the lack of space.
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Table 7.3: Equivalent trace representation of Inverse S-Box
g(x) = x8 + x6 + x5 + x4 + 1
k f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 78 3A 9 A4 CD A5 8F BC
3 4A 22 B6 C7 2E 4E 4B 45
5 64 A 5C 66 2A 40 63 B
7 83 E9 21 D6 84 55 C1 98
9 F8 DC 75 60 4 F2 EB 16
11 DC 23 7A B4 F5 CC F0 7B
13 9 DF 6E C5 BF 6C 89 84
15 ED 10 A7 A2 3E 31 46 53
17 DB DB 1 97 BD BD 4C DA
19 CD 90 72 CA FA 18 4 86
21 4E 4C 89 32 9 F7 47 4
23 7F 90 B8 E6 47 30 90 A8
25 5A 9 3E 4A 7D EB B D
27 1F AD E7 78 9D 7B 70 94
29 50 4E E4 47 1A 5 6D F6
31 0 8B 6E DA B 2 B5 71
37 62 34 CB 53 53 C4 27 5F
39 6F 36 D9 F6 B2 BF FB 7A
43 8D 21 24 50 DD 57 8D EF
45 D3 89 77 47 43 C1 A1 FD
47 48 FB 64 49 3D F2 FE 71
51 DB DA DB DA BD 2A DB 66
53 3 92 2B F1 F6 66 C6 2B
55 44 2C 47 2D 6C 91 DE 37
59 72 C2 A7 DF 66 48 75 9D
61 D 10 7C 18 20 53 5A 79
63 AE 51 66 77 FE 2D 36 CB
85 DB DB DA DA 0 DB DB DA
87 2F 3D 21 E4 74 59 5F EF
91 0 30 6D 65 B4 84 1E F2
95 F8 7E BE 60 6 8B 40 73
111 34 2C 80 8F FE 57 4A D9
119 F1 97 BD DA 1 2A 4D DB
127 AA 23 BA 3 7E 56 25 57
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7.4 Linear Complexity of Inverse Component Se-
quences
In Section 2.5 we defined the linear complexity of a binary sequence as the size in
bits of the shortest LFSR that generates that sequence. Another way to determine
the linear complexity of a binary sequence is through its Fourier spectrum using
the DFT [52]. Let a = ai be a sequence over F2 of period N where N divides 2n−1,
and let A = Ai be its spectral sequence, then the linear complexity of a is given by
LC(a) = |{k|Ak 6= 0, 0 ≤ k ≤ N}|.
In other words the linear complexity of the sequence is equal to the Hamming
weight of its spectral sequence. From the definition of the trace function it is
obvious that we can now determine the linear complexity of a sequence from the
trace representation of its corresponding function, i.e.,
LC(a) = |{k2i mod 2n − 1|Ak 6= 0, k ∈ Γ(n), i = 0, 1, . . . nk − 1}|.
If we consider the trace representation of the inverse S-box under the defining
polynomial x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1, then each function has only one trace term.
This means that the binary sequence corresponding to each function has a linear
complexity of 8. However when we change the defining polynomial to x8 + x6 +
x5 + x4 + 1, the sequences corresponding to all functions except f1 and f5 have
linear complexity of 255 which is the maximum value of the linear complexity for
a sequence of length 28 − 1.
7.5 Polynomial Representation of DES S-boxes
DES is a 64 bit symmetric block cipher. It has 16 rounds and in each round only
half the bits i.e., 32 go through a keyed round function. The round function first
expands the 32 bit input to 48 bits followed by the addition of a 48 bit subkey. After
the key addition, input goes through 8 distinct S-boxes followed by a permutation
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Table 7.4: Polynomial representation of DES S-Box, S1, for x6 + x + 1
F1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 14 62 23 51 4 54 14 31
1 38 17 22 25 4 43 24 11
2 32 33 0 47 49 43 60 30
3 56 58 30 6 0 35 15 10
4 35 56 24 26 29 27 23 6
5 33 50 33 44 25 55 21 62
6 57 53 24 39 61 5 62 21
7 47 2 13 9 41 25 49 0
thus giving the output of the round function. Unlike AES the S-boxes are only
described in terms of input/output tables. Each S-box has a 6 bit input and 4 bit
output. For more details on DES please refer to [31]. Since the S-boxes of DES
are only specified as input/output tables, we can use Lagrange interpolation to find
an equivalent polynomial representation over F26 . Tables 7.4 through 7.11 show
the polynomial representation of the eight DES S-boxes (S1 through S8) obtained
by using the defining polynomial x6 + x + 1. Fi is the polynomial representation
of the S-Box Si. The 64 coefficients in the polynomial representation are arranged
in eight rows and eight columns and expressed in decimal format. For example in
Table 7.4 second row and first column lists coefficient b8 = 38.
The polynomial representation of S-boxes confirms the high algebraic degree
of the S-boxes as well as high number of nonzero monomial terms. Changing the
defining polynomial has little effect on the algebraic properties of the S-boxes. The
polynomial representation of the 8 S-boxes under all 9 irreducible polynomials of
degree 6 over F2 were obtained and they all consist of a large number of monomials.
We have not listed them here due to lack of space.
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Table 7.5: Polynomial representation of DES S-Box, S2, for x6 + x + 1
F2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 15 14 38 54 58 8 62 26
1 58 9 26 42 23 29 54 50
2 37 41 46 41 20 30 17 18
3 17 62 27 54 54 15 8 35
4 5 55 56 62 45 29 22 45
5 21 46 21 25 36 2 28 7
6 63 45 62 30 16 51 56 19
7 9 37 47 56 34 57 54 0
Table 7.6: Polynomial representation of DES S-Box, S3, for x6 + x + 1
F3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 10 48 49 17 23 48 41 39
1 4 40 16 38 0 48 15 4
2 22 3 19 62 9 23 54 36
3 43 42 2 19 28 19 53 10
4 6 51 52 13 62 32 17 6
5 18 24 17 14 9 17 46 16
6 34 56 18 57 6 11 3 32
7 1 18 29 13 27 39 16 0
7.6 Trace Representation of DES S-boxes
To compute the trace representation of the DES S-boxes we first decompose the
input output mapping of each S-box (from F26 → F24) into 4 functions as follows:
Fi(x) = (fi1(x), fi2(x), fi3(x), fi4(x))
where i is the index of the S-box and each component function is a mapping from
F26 → F2 . Gong and Golomb in [50] computed the trace representation of all 32
component functions of the 8 DES S-boxes using the primitive polynomial x6+x+1.
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Table 7.7: Polynomial representation of DES S-Box, S4, for x6 + x + 1
F4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 7 1 50 37 23 21 39 58
1 28 2 60 16 47 7 32 61
2 8 4 39 2 2 23 23 24
3 45 57 2 3 55 26 14 31
4 56 41 3 10 34 49 12 26
5 41 33 31 34 9 3 8 44
6 46 40 14 2 45 25 3 61
7 6 46 52 6 10 45 37 0
Table 7.8: Polynomial representation of DES S-Box, S5, for x6 + x + 1
F5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 2 44 52 61 61 48 40 12
1 15 13 57 51 23 62 46 36
2 51 15 17 36 42 20 57 20
3 55 25 13 52 11 25 36 63
4 29 35 54 57 18 45 28 43
5 28 59 18 51 55 37 36 61
6 20 18 9 62 58 35 18 25
7 4 3 62 2 24 41 48 0
In order to see the effect of changing the defining polynomial we compute the trace
representations of S-boxes with different irreducible polynomial: x6+x5+x4+x+1.
Tables 7.12 through 7.19 show the trace representations of eight DES S-boxes. Each
entry in the table represents a trace term and the coset leader k corresponding to
the trace term is listed in the top row, i.e., in Table 7.12 the third term in the first





Table 7.9: Polynomial representation of DES S-Box, S6, for x6 + x + 1
F6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 12 21 35 44 24 34 12 57
1 21 13 53 6 18 31 30 9
2 47 24 5 34 56 39 56 50
3 45 36 11 30 13 51 16 53
4 19 52 21 60 0 3 63 57
5 34 53 32 19 14 63 13 38
6 35 15 28 42 50 18 34 61
7 22 31 6 27 26 1 52 0
Table 7.10: Polynomial representation of DES S-Box, S7, for x6 + x + 1
F7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 4 60 51 30 36 15 42 3
1 2 51 8 9 19 2 0 13
2 22 27 58 57 21 31 2 40
3 58 45 27 58 60 9 30 48
4 50 63 44 7 11 27 13 23
5 43 51 20 34 50 48 60 52
6 38 32 3 39 25 21 2 32
7 29 18 40 61 52 28 5 0
7.7 Linear Complexity of DES S-Box Component
Sequences
In [50], Gong and Golomb also computed the linear complexity of all the 32 func-
tions associated with the 8 S-boxes using the defining polynomial x6 +x+1. Their
results showed that sequences corresponding to 21 functions had linear span 63
which is the maximal linear span for F26 and all the remaining sequences had lin-
ear span greater than 57. However when we change the defining polynomial to
x6 + x5 + x4 + x + 1 the linear complexity of the sequences changes slightly. Table
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Table 7.11: Polynomial representation of DES S-Box, S8, for x6 + x + 1
F8 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 13 58 6 21 62 58 46 37
1 55 6 6 55 63 7 1 1
2 1 5 48 14 33 62 29 40
3 1 52 16 43 47 50 22 9
4 58 17 51 40 56 25 4 0
5 35 59 50 14 38 38 10 63
6 24 48 46 44 47 10 14 2
7 17 3 31 0 51 7 51 0
Table 7.12: Trace representation of DES S-Box, S1, for x6 + x5 + x4 + x + 1
F1 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 21 23 27 31
f11 0 32 15 49 15 10 45 12 23 0 62 0 28
f12 1 11 42 24 11 0 35 19 63 1 60 1 40
f13 1 0 0 4 3 37 53 7 52 56 16 11 40
f14 1 53 46 30 59 47 36 9 50 57 28 0 24
Table 7.13: Trace representation of DES S-Box, S2, for x6 + x5 + x4 + x + 1
F2 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 21 23 27 31
f21 1 16 58 10 33 1 21 40 24 1 6 11 2
f22 1 12 1 19 58 37 26 63 1 56 47 11 54
f23 1 49 45 58 8 47 59 34 54 57 16 1 54
f24 1 33 2 62 55 11 25 43 48 57 38 36 52
7.19 shows that the linear complexity of the sequences corresponding to the func-
tions f11,f12,f13, and f14 are 52, 55, 60 and 61 respectively. Although under this
polynomial the linear span of the functions is reduced, this reduction is minimal
and in our opinion does not signify a weakness.
131
Table 7.14: Trace representation of DES S-Box, S3, for x6 + x5 + x4 + x + 1
F3 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 21 23 27 31
f31 0 18 59 47 2 37 20 2 11 57 32 46 26
f32 1 49 24 14 0 46 24 32 13 56 55 47 42
f33 0 41 10 20 31 11 59 62 49 56 18 1 6
f34 1 51 63 55 4 11 33 50 13 0 4 11 48
Table 7.15: Trace representation of DES S-Box, S4, for x6 + x5 + x4 + x + 1
F4 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 21 23 27 31
f41 1 7 61 51 56 47 3 47 7 0 61 46 6
f42 1 9 17 29 53 10 3 58 25 1 11 37 6
f43 1 5 5 12 25 37 6 0 42 57 57 47 6
f44 0 53 59 61 3 46 40 30 52 1 15 36 6
Table 7.16: Trace representation of DES S-Box, S5, for x6 + x5 + x4 + x + 1
F5 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 21 23 27 31
f51 0 3 16 61 29 11 35 16 43 0 23 47 6
f52 1 44 43 21 31 1 47 55 14 1 51 10 40
f53 0 13 21 39 24 36 60 24 7 1 14 47 26
f54 0 19 27 29 3 47 27 54 31 0 50 1 52
Table 7.17: Trace representation of DES S-Box, S6, for x6 + x5 + x4 + x + 1
F6 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 21 23 27 31
f61 0 23 57 40 37 1 58 25 15 0 31 36 48
f62 0 55 55 45 2 36 45 49 18 56 36 37 54
f63 1 12 29 49 34 10 22 12 49 56 21 37 24
f64 1 11 9 55 14 11 1 45 45 0 3 0 44
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Table 7.18: Trace representation of DES S-Box, S7, for x6 + x5 + x4 + x + 1
F7 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 21 23 27 31
f71 0 20 11 34 25 36 29 40 43 56 21 10 4
f72 0 5 53 23 8 11 8 44 22 0 52 37 28
f73 1 36 63 3 24 47 36 10 26 57 45 47 52
f74 0 62 55 54 22 47 42 58 2 0 61 1 30
Table 7.19: Trace representation of DES S-Box, S8, for x6 + x5 + x4 + x + 1
F8 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 21 23 27 31
f81 1 9 21 30 28 10 34 0 32 0 11 0 24
f82 0 0 58 41 60 37 52 15 52 0 1 47 54
f83 1 39 51 46 12 11 34 46 7 57 43 0 26
f84 1 26 3 47 1 10 18 56 43 0 12 1 44
7.8 Conclusions
The inverse S-box has a very simple algebraic description under its original defining
polynomial. The function is highly nonlinear however it is represented by only one
monomial term. Similarly the trace representations of its component functions
contain one term each which means a linear span of only 8. How and if this fact
can be used in the cryptanalysis of AES is not clear at this time. It is clear
however that changing the defining polynomial results in polynomial descriptions
that are very complex and trace representations that have large linear spans. This
implies that changing the defining polynomial may not be of much significance
from algebraic cryptanalysis viewpoint. DES S-boxes on the other hand are only
specified in terms of their input/output mapping without any algebraic descriptions.
The algebraic representations for all the irreducible defining polynomials have high
degrees and large number of monomial terms. Similarly trace representations of the
component functions have very large linear spans under all irreducible polynomials.




Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis we designed two new stream ciphers and analyzed nonlinear transfor-
mations based on power mappings for their resistance against algebraic attacks. In
this chapter we provide a summary of our contributions and also list the publica-
tions in which these contributions were presented. We also list directions in which
this work can be extended and provide some interesting open problems.
8.1 Summary of Contributions
Design and Analysis of WG Ciphers: We began this work by designing a
stream cipher suitable for hardware oriented applications. Our goal was to design
an efficient and secure stream cipher which produces a keystream with provable ran-
domness properties. We provided the theoretical background to explain our choice
of various mathematical transformations used in the design. This was followed by
specific guidelines on how to select the parameters and then design a WG cipher for
the required security and efficiency. The WG cipher designed for 128-bit security
was also submitted to the eSTREAM project in the hardware category. The design
and analysis of WG-128 was first presented in [86]. This report is also available at
the eSTREAM project webpage [87]. The theoretical background and guidelines
on how to design a WG cipher for desired security level are presented in [88].
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Design and Analysis of RC4-like Keystream Generator: RC4-like keystream
generator has been designed for high speed software applications. Our design was
inspired by the simple and efficient design of the RC4 stream cipher. We designed
RC4-like keystream generator to address a specific deficiency in the original RC4
design, i.e., its inability to exploit the 32/64 bit architectures of the modern pro-
cessors. RC4-like keystream generator employs 32/64 bit instructions and it is
approximately 3.1 times faster than RC4 on 32-bit machines. We analyzed the se-
curity of our design and showed the our design is resistant to several distinguishing
attacks that are successful against RC4. We also showed that recovering the in-
ternal state of RC4-like keystream generator is much harder than the original RC4
cipher. The RC4-like keystream generator was presented in [53].
Algebraic Immunity of Boolean Functions Based on Power Mappings:
Following the design of stream ciphers we turned our attention to nonlinear trans-
formations, i.e., Boolean functions, used in stream ciphers. We investigated the
algebraic immunity of the Boolean functions based on power mappings. We devel-
oped techniques to analyze the algebraic degree of these functions in the polynomial
form. These techniques were then used to derive upper bounds on the algebraic
immunity of several well known Boolean functions. We proved that most of these
functions have low algebraic immunity. Finally we generalized our results to all
functions in the polynomial form. This work was first presented in [82] and was
then extended in [83].
Algebraic Immunity of S-Boxes Based on Power Mappings: In this con-
tribution we examined the resistance of S-boxes based on power mappings against
algebraic attacks. We developed techniques to find the number of bi-affine and
quadratic equations satisfied by an S-box based on power mappings. From these
techniques we developed two efficient algorithms to count the total number of these
equations for a given S-box. To design secure S-boxes we gave constructions that
guarantee zero bi-affine and quadratic equations. Finally we examined these S-
boxes for their resistance against linear and differential cryptanalysis and identified
several cryptographically strong S-boxes. The efficient algorithms to count the
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number of bi-affine and quadratic equations were presented in [84]. An extension of
this paper which contains new S-box constructions and the list of cryptographically
strong S-boxes is available at [85].
Equivalent Algebraic Descriptions of S-Boxes: In our final contribution we
derived equivalent algebraic descriptions of inverse and DES S-boxes. We focused
on the polynomial and trace representations of these S-boxes. We computed the
number of monomials in these representations and derived the linear complexity of
their component functions. This provided us with an insight into their algebraic
structure and other cryptographic properties.
8.2 Future Work
In this section we discuss how the work presented in this thesis can be extended
in future. We list possible improvements on our results and also list some related
open problems.
Design of Stream Ciphers: The WG stream cipher presented in Chapter 3 filters
the output of an LFSR. Recently some stream ciphers have been proposed that
filter NLFSR or in general they have nonlinear state update functions [36]. These
designs are more efficient than the WG ciphers. However it is very difficult to
prove that they produce keystream with desired randomness properties. Therefore
there is a need to develop techniques to analyze these designs. This will increase
our understanding and confidence in such designs. Some open problems related
to stream ciphers that use nonlinear state updates are: designing state update
functions that guarantee long cycles, calculating the exact period of the keystream,
and establishing lower and upper bounds on the linear complexity of the keystream.
It was mentioned in Chapter 4 that RC4-like keystream generator is vulnerable
to a distinguishing attack. An obvious next step is to modify RC4-like keystream
generator to ensure that it is safe against such distinguishers. We proposed the
addition of a few bitwise instructions to break the linearity over Z232 . The final
design must be analyzed carefully to ensure that these modifications will make
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RC4-like keystream generator safe against distinguishing attacks. The challenge
here is to maintain, as much as possible, the simplicity of the present design.
Improving Bounds on Algebraic Immunity of Boolean Functions: In Chap-
ter 5 we used the theory of polynomial functions to prove upper bounds on the al-
gebraic immunity of several well known functions. Experimental results show that
in some cases our bounds seem to be tight but in other cases, although very close,
our bounds are not tight. A possible extension of this work is to see if these bounds
can be improved. More interesting, however, is the problem of finding the lower
bounds on the algebraic immunity of these functions. It seems to be a hard prob-
lem. Proving an upper bound requires proving the existence of a single function
of particular polynomial form whereas proving a lower bound requires proving the
absence of all the functions of a particular polynomial form. The latter is a more
difficult problem. However this can help us design large functions with provable
high algebraic immunity.
Design of Block Ciphers Resistant to Algebraic Attacks: We have identified
several cryptographically strong S-boxes in Chapter 6. Some of these S-boxes satisfy
very small number of multivariate quadratic equations and their corresponding sys-
tem of equations is underdefined and very likely more difficult to solve. However an
interesting approach is to take an existing block cipher such as AES and replace it’s
S-box with another one that does not satisfy any multivariate quadratic equation.
Unlike the AES S-box, which is optimal in terms of providing resistance against
linear and differential cryptanalysis (but very poor against algebraic cryptanalysis),
the new S-box will likely decrease the resistance of the block cipher against these
two attacks. This decrease in resistance can be quantified and compensated by
increasing the number of rounds in the new design. Calculating this increase in the
number of rounds and evaluating the efficiency of the new design will provide an
interesting alternative. This can also address concerns related to the vulnerability
of many block ciphers to algebraic attacks.
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Appendix A
CN Matrix for Normal Basis Multiplier in F229


0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0




C Implementation of a Normal Basis Multiplier in F229
Following is the C implementation (32 bit word size) of the normal basis multiplier for the
normal basis defined by γ in Section 3.5. The implementation is based on the algorithm
given in [92].
#define ROTL29(v, n)
(unsigned)(((v) ¿ (n)) | ((v) À (29 - (n))))& 0xFFFFFFF8
void mult(unsigned int a, unsigned int b, unsigned int* c){
unsigned int A[29], B[29];
/*precomputation*/
































*cˆ= A[1] & (B[0] ˆB[21]);
*cˆ= A[2] & (B[6] ˆB[21]);
*cˆ= A[3] & (B[13] ˆB[18]);
*cˆ= A[4] & (B[11] ˆB[27]);
*cˆ= A[5] & (B[17] ˆB[20]);
*cˆ= A[6] & (B[2] ˆB[22]);
*cˆ= A[7] & (B[13] ˆB[25]);
*cˆ= A[8] & (B[9] ˆB[10]);
*cˆ= A[9] & (B[8] ˆB[14]);
*cˆ= A[10] & (B[8] ˆB[26]);
*cˆ= A[11] & (B[4] ˆB[14]);
*cˆ= A[12] & (B[17] ˆB[24]);
*cˆ= A[13] & (B[3] ˆB[7]);
*cˆ= A[14] & (B[9] ˆB[11]);
*cˆ= A[15] & (B[24] ˆB[26]);
*cˆ= A[16] & (B[19] ˆB[23]);
*cˆ= A[17] & (B[5] ˆB[12]);
*cˆ= A[18] & (B[3] ˆB[22]);
*cˆ= A[19] & (B[16] ˆB[27]);
*cˆ= A[20] & (B[5] ˆB[28]);
*cˆ= A[21] & (B[1] ˆB[2]);
*cˆ= A[22] & (B[6] ˆB[18]);
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*cˆ= A[23] & (B[16] ˆB[25]);
*cˆ= A[24] & (B[12] ˆB[15]);
*cˆ= A[25] & (B[7] ˆB[23]);
*cˆ= A[26] & (B[10] ˆB[15]);
*cˆ= A[27] & (B[4] ˆB[19]);
*cˆ= A[28] & (B[20] ˆB[28]);
}
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C Implementation of a Normal Basis Inverter in F229
The following C implementation (32 bit word size) uses the normal basis multiplication
to find inverse of an element in F229 . The following implementation is based on the
algorithm given in [41].
#define ROTL29(v, n)
(unsigned)(((v) ¿ (n)) | ((v) À (29 - (n))))& 0xFFFFFFF8
#define ROTR29(v, n) ROTL29(v, 29 - (n))












mult(b, ROTR29(b, 2), b);
/*1*/




Initial Values for RC4(8,32)
Initial values for RC4(8, 32) in hexadecimal format.
a0 = 144D4800 a1 = 32736901 a2 = 51988B02 a3 = 6FBEAD03
a4 = 8DE4CE04 a5 = AC0AF005 a6 = CA301206 a7 = E8553407
a8 = 067B5508 a9 = 25A17709 a10 = 43C7990A a11 = 61ECBA0B
a12 = 7F12DC0C a13 = 9E38FE0D a14 = BC5E1F0E a15 = DA84410F
a16 = F9A96310 a17 = 17CF8411 a18 = 35F5A612 a19 = 531BC813
a20 = 7240E914 a21 = 90660B15 a22 = AE8C2D16 a23 = CCB24E17
a24 = EBD87018 a25 = 09FD9219 a26 = 2723B31A a27 = 4649D51B
a28 = 646FF71C a29 = 8294181D a30 = A0BA3A1E a31 = BFE05C1F
a32 = DD067D20 a33 = FB2C9F21 a34 = 1951C122 a35 = 3877E223
a36 = 569D0424 a37 = 74C32625 a38 = 93E84726 a39 = B10E6927
a40 = CF348B28 a41 = ED5AAC29 a42 = 0C80CE2A a43 = 2AA5F02B
a44 = 48CB112C a45 = 66F1332D a46 = 8517552E a47 = A33C762F
a48 = C1629830 a49 = E088BA31 a50 = FEAEDB32 a51 = 1CD4FD33
a52 = 3AF91F34 a53 = 591F4035 a54 = 77456236 a55 = 956B8437
a56 = B490A538 a57 = D2B6C739 a58 = F0DCE93A a59 = 0E020A3B
a60 = 2D282C3C a61 = 4B4D4E3D a62 = 6973703E a63 = 8799913F
a64 = A6BFB340 a65 = C4E4D541 a66 = E20AF642 a67 = 01301843
a68 = 1F563A44 a69 = 3D7C5B45 a70 = 5BA17D46 a71 = 7AC79F47
a72 = 98EDC048 a73 = B613E249 a74 = D438044A a75 = F35E254B
a76 = 1184474C a77 = 2FAA694D a78 = 4ED08A4E a79 = 6CF5AC4F
a80 = 8A1BCE50 a81 = A841EF51 a82 = C7671152 a83 = E58C3353
a84 = 03B25454 a85 = 21D87655 a86 = 40FE9856 a87 = 5E24B957
a88 = 7C49DB58 a89 = 9B6FFD59 a90 = B9951E5A a91 = D7BB405B
a92 = F5E0625C a93 = 1406835D a94 = 322CA55E a95 = 5052C75F
a96 = 6F78E860 a97 = 8D9D0A61 a98 = ABC32C62 a99 = C9E94D63
a100 = E80F6F64 a101 = 06349165 a102 = 245AB266 a103 = 4280D467
a104 = 61A6F668 a105 = 7FCC1769 a106 = 9DF1396A a107 = BC175B6B
a108 = DA3D7C6C a109 = F8639E6D a110 = 1688C06E a111 = 35AEE16F
a112 = 53D40370 a113 = 71FA2571 a114 = 8F204772 a115 = AE456873
a116 = CC6B8A74 a117 = EA91AC75 a118 = 09B7CD76 a119 = 27DCEF77
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a120 = 45021178 a121 = 63283279 a122 = 824E547A a123 = A074767B
a124 = BE99977C a125 = DCBFB97D a126 = FBE5DB7E a127 = 190BFC7F
a128 = 37301E80 a129 = 56564081 a130 = 747C6182 a131 = 92A28383
a132 = B0C8A584 a133 = CFEDC685 a134 = ED13E886 a135 = 0B390A87
a136 = 2A5F2B88 a137 = 48844D89 a138 = 66AA6F8A a139 = 84D0908B
a140 = A3F6B28C a141 = C11CD48D a142 = DF41F58E a143 = FD67178F
a144 = 1C8D3990 a145 = 3AB35A91 a146 = 58D87C92 a147 = 77FE9E93
a148 = 9524BF94 a149 = B34AE195 a150 = D1700396 a151 = F0952497
a152 = 0EBB4698 a153 = 2CE16899 a154 = 4A07899A a155 = 692CAB9B
a156 = 8752CD9C a157 = A578EE9D a158 = C49E109E a159 = E2C4329F
a160 = 00E953A0 a161 = 1E0F75A1 a162 = 3D3597A2 a163 = 5B5BB8A3
a164 = 7980DAA4 a165 = 97A6FCA5 a166 = B6CC1DA6 a167 = D4F23FA7
a168 = F21861A8 a169 = 113D83A9 a170 = 2F63A4AA a171 = 4D89C6AB
a172 = 6BAFE8AC a173 = 8AD409AD a174 = A8FA2BAE a175 = C6204DAF
a176 = E5466EB0 a177 = 036C90B1 a178 = 2191B2B2 a179 = 3FB7D3B3
a180 = 5EDDF5B4 a181 = 7C0317B5 a182 = 9A2838B6 a183 = B84E5AB7
a184 = D7747CB8 a185 = F59A9DB9 a186 = 13C0BFBA a187 = 32E5E1BB
a188 = 500B02BC a189 = 6E3124BD a190 = 8C5746BE a191 = AB7C67BF
a192 = C9A289C0 a193 = E7C8ABC1 a194 = 05EECCC2 a195 = 2414EEC3
a196 = 423910C4 a197 = 605F31C5 a198 = 7F8553C6 a199 = 9DAB75C7
a200 = BBD096C8 a201 = D9F6B8C9 a202 = F81CDACA a203 = 1642FBCB
a204 = 34681DCC a205 = 528D3FCD a206 = 71B360CE a207 = 8FD982CF
a208 = ADFFA4D0 a209 = CC24C5D1 a210 = EA4AE7D2 a211 = 087009D3
a212 = 26962AD4 a213 = 45BC4CD5 a214 = 63E16ED6 a215 = 81078FD7
a216 = 9F2DB1D8 a217 = BE53D3D9 a218 = DC78F4DA a219 = FA9E16DB
a220 = 19C438DC a221 = 37EA5ADD a222 = 55107BDE a223 = 73359DDF
a224 = 925BBFE0 a225 = B081E0E1 a226 = CEA702E2 a227 = EDCC24E3
a228 = 0BF245E4 a229 = 291867E5 a230 = 473E89E6 a231 = 6664AAE7
a232 = 8489CCE8 a233 = A2AFEEE9 a234 = C0D50FEA a235 = DFFB31EB
a236 = FD2053EC a237 = 1B4674ED a238 = 3A6C96EE a239 = 5892B8EF
a240 = 76B8D9F0 a241 = 94DDFBF1 a242 = B3031DF2 a243 = D1293EF3
a244 = EF4F60F4 a245 = 0D7482F5 a246 = 2C9AA3F6 a247 = 4AC0C5F7
a248 = 68E6E7F8 a249 = 870C08F9 a250 = A5312AFA a251 = C3574CFB
a252 = E17D6DFC a253 = 00A38FFD a254 = 1EC8B1FE a255 = 3CEED2FF
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